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3.1  Introduction 
There is now widespread agreement in the economics profession that “high” 
rates of inflation have significant adverse consequences and that these adverse 
effects justify  the  sacrifices  in  employment  and  output  that  are  generally 
needed to reduce inflation.’ There is, however, much less professional support 
for the goal of  “price stability” that central bankers advocate and that many 
governments and central banks are now seeking. The purpose of this paper is 
to examine the economic case for making the transition from low inflation to 
price stability. 
Because measurement problems cause official inflation  measures to over- 
state the rate of increase of buying a constant utility bundle of  goods and ser- 
vices, price stability is generally taken to mean a measured inflation rate of 
about 2%.2 The analysis in this paper therefore addresses the following ques- 
tion: If the true and fully anticipated rate of  inflation (i.e., the measured rate of 
inflation  minus 2 percentage  points)  has  stabilized at 2%,  is the gain  from 
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1. See, e.g., Fischer (1981, 1994) and Fischer and Modigliani (1978). This has not always been 
so. Until the late 1970s. many economists in the United States argued that the cost of reducing the 
existing rate of inflation was too high and that the economy should learn to live with moderate 
rates of inflation. The high rate of  inflation in the late 1970s and early  1980s together with the 
rapid disinflation during the early 1980s appears to have virtually eliminated professional support 
for that view. 
2. This has been made explicit by  the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, among other cen- 
tral banks. 
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reducing inflation to zero worth the sacrifice in output and employment that 
would be required to achieve it?3 
To answer this question it is important to recognize that the cost of reducing 
inflation is a “one-time’’ loss of output and employment while the benefit of a 
lower inflation  rate is permanent. The appropriate  “cost benefit  analysis” of 
reducing inflation is therefore a comparison of the one-time cost of reducing 
inflation with the present value of the permanent benefits of price stability? 
The calculations  presented  in this paper show that the present  value of  the 
benefits of price stability exceed the costs of getting there. For the most plau- 
sible parameter values, the benefits of price stability exceed the costs of transi- 
tion within  six to nine years. For some parameter combinations, the relative 
gains are even larger. In every case, the present value of the benefits exceed the 
costs even when the benefits are discounted at the rate of return that individuals 
receive on a risky portfolio of common stocks. 
This way of stating the problem makes it clear that it is not necessary to ask 
whether the benefit of price stability relative to a 2% inflation rate is “large” 
in some absolute sense (whatever that might mean) but only whether it is large 
enough to exceed the cost of transition. Similarly, the relevant policy decision 
does not depend on whether a higher rate of inflation reduces the rate of eco- 
nomic growth if it reduces the level of real income in each future year.5 
Since the reduction  in real  income caused by  inflation is proportional  to 
national income, the annual benefit of having a lower rate of  inflation grows 
over time (even though the rate of growth itself is unaffected). To see the impli- 
cations of this, note that discounting an annual benefit  equal to x% of GDP 
at a discount rate of d in an economy that grows at 2.5%  a year (the rate of 
growth of U.S. real GDP from 1970 through 1994) yields a present value of xl 
Although a case could be made for discounting at a very low risk-free rate 
of return, to be more conservative I will use the return that individuals receive 
on a risky portfolio of corporate stocks. During the past quarter century, the 
real net-of-tax return that an individual investor received on an investment in 
the Standard and Poor’s composite was 5.1%.6 An annual benefit of x percent 
of GDP  therefore has a present value of ~4.05  1 -  .025) = 38.5 x. The evidence 
(d -  0.025). 
3. Since it is the “true” rate of inflation that matters, I subtract 2 percentage points of  inflation 
from the measured rate of  inflation in all of the calculations presented in this paper. 
4.  There may of course be shocks in the future that raise or lower the inflation rate. I will not 
deal with this explicitly, focusing on the comparison of  stable inflation at 2% versus price stability. 
Because the net benefit (i.e., the present value of  the benefits of lower inflation minus the net cost 
of the change in inflation) is essentially constant in the range that we are considering, the appro- 
priate response to such future inflation shocks is just a repetition of the basic problem discussed 
in this paper. 
5. Barro (1995) presents evidence showing that there is no statistically significant relation be- 
tween inflation and growth when the rate of  inflation is under 10%. 
6. Between 1970 and 1994, the Standard and Poor’s index rose at a nominal rate of 6.48.  The 
average dividend yield was 4.0%. The rate of  increase of  the consumer price index was  5.7%, 
implying a ‘‘true’’  inflation rate of  3.7 percent. Assuming a 25%  marginal rate of  tax on dividends 125  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
discussed in section 3.2 implies that the likely cost of reducing inflation from 
2% to zero is equal to between 4% and 6% of the initial GDP. Even using the 
upper limit of 6% implies that the benefits of disinflation outweigh the costs if 
the annual benefit of lower inflation exceeds x*  = 6.0/38.5  = 0.16% of GDP. 
The analysis in sections 3.3 through 3.6 implies that the annual benefit substan- 
tially exceeds this critical value, with the most plausible value of the annual 
gain being equal to about 1  % of GDP, indicating that the gain from price stabil- 
ity would  outweigh the  costs of getting there from the current low level of 
inflation even if those gains were discounted at a very much higher rate. 
The emphasis in my analysis is on the distortion in the process of household 
capital accumulation that occurs because of the interaction of inflation and tax 
rules’ and on the consequence of that distortion for tax revenue. One important 
aspect of this is the negative effect of inflation on the real net return to saving. 
This distorts the allocation of lifetime consumption between early years and 
later years. Section  3.3 evaluates the  deadweight  loss that results  from this 
distortion and from the associated effects on government revenue. Contrary to 
traditional welfare analysis, those revenue effects are important as soon as we 
recognize that any revenue gain from lower inflation permits a reduction in 
other distortionary taxes (and, similarly, any revenue loss from lower inflation 
requires an increase in some other distortionary tax). 
The inflation-induced reduction in the net return to financial assets also in- 
duces increased investment in owner-occupied residential real estate. Section 
3.4 evaluates the deadweight  loss that results  from this  effect of  higher in- 
flation. 
In both cases, even the small reduction of inflation from 2% to zero can have 
a substantial effect on economic welfare because inflation increases the tax- 
induced distortions that would exist even with price stability. The deadweight 
loss associated with the shift from zero inflation to a 2% inflation rate is there- 
fore not the traditional “small triangle” that would result from distorting a first- 
best equilibrium but is the much larger “trapezoid” that results from increasing 
a large initial distortion. 
These adverse effects of the tax-inflation  interaction could in principle be 
eliminated by indexing the tax system or by shifting from our current system 
of corporate and personal income taxes to a tax based only on consumption or 
labor income. As a practical matter, however, such tax reforms are extremely 
unlikely. Section 3.8 discusses some of the difficulties of shifting to an indexed 
tax system in which capital income and expenses are measured in real terms. 
Although such a shift has been advocated for at least two decades, there has 
and a 10% effective rate of tax on capital gains implies a real net return on the Standard and Poor’s 
portfolio of 0.75 (4.0) + 0.90(6.4) -  3.7 = 5.1%. 
7. In an earlier series of  papers collected in Feldstein (1983), I examined the effect of the inter- 
action of inflation and tax rules on tax  liabilities, on equilibrium interest rates and asset prices, 
and on the accumulation of residential and nonresidential capital. None of those studies considered 
the welfare consequences of  this interaction. 126  Martin Feldstein 
been no legislation along those lines. It is significant, moreover, that no indus- 
trial country has fully (or even substantially) indexed its tax laws. More gener- 
ally, the annual gains from shifting to price stability that are identified in this 
paper exceed the costs of the transition within a very few years. Even if one 
could be sure that the tax-inflation distortions would be eliminated ten years 
from now, the present value gain from price stability until then would exceed 
the cost of the inflation reduction. 
The inflation-induced  distortion in the lifetime allocation  of consumption 
and in the allocation of  spending between housing and other forms of con- 
sumption are only two of the many ways in which inflation imposes a cost on 
the economy. The most studied of  these is the distortion  in the demand for 
money.8 The interaction  of  inflation and tax rules also causes distortions  in 
the mix of business investment,’ in corporate finance,1° and in the structure of 
individual portfolios.”  Higher inflation rates may also imply more volatile in- 
flation.12 
Absolute price stability, as opposed to merely a lower rate of inflation, may 
bring a qualitatively different kind of benefit. A history of price stability may 
bring a “credibility bonus” in dealing with inflationary shocks. People who see 
persistent price-level stability expect that it will persist in the future and that 
the government will respond to shocks in a way that maintains the price level. 
In contrast, if people see that the price level does not remain stable, they may 
have less confidence in the government’s ability or willingness to respond to 
inflation shocks in a way that maintains the initial inflation rate. If so, any given 
positive demand shock may lead to more inflation and may require a greater 
8. Bailey (1956) quantified the welfare loss of the reduction in the use of non-interest-bearing 
money. This pioneering paper led to a very large literature of  refinements and criticisms. Phelps 
(1973) argued that since seigniorage gains from inflation permit a reduction in other distortionary 
taxes some positive rate of inflation may be appropriate as part of an overall optimal tax structure. 
More precisely, it implies that the optimal rate of inflation would be greater than Milton Friedman’s 
optimum (1969) of minus the marginal product of capital. 
In Feldstein (1979),  I  evaluated the trade-off between the gains of reduced  inflation and  the 
costs of  achieving that reduction in  terms of the impact on the demand for money. That paper 
showed that a case can be made for a discount rate at which the permanent reduction in the “shoe- 
leather” costs of distorted money demand exceeds the temporary cost of achieving lower inflation. 
None of these studies takes into account the taxation of capital income and the interaction of 
inflation and tax rules. 
9. Because depreciation is not adjusted for inflation, an increase in the rate of inflation favors 
investment in inventories and short-lived equipment. 
10. The mixture of debt and equity finance is affected by the fact that nominal interest rates are 
deducted by  business borrowers. Although portfolio investors are taxed on nominal interest in- 
comes, their tax rates are typically lower than the tax rates of the borrowers. Much corporate debt 
is also held by  untaxed entities like pension funds. 
I I. The taxation of nominal interest and of nominal capital gains distorts the composition of 
household portfolios. 
12. Although the relation between the level and volatility of inflation has been established in a 
number of  studies, it is not clear if this applies at the low levels of inflation that are the subject of 
the current research. 127  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
output loss to reverse  than  would  be  true in  an economy with a history  of 
stable prices. 
A stable price level is also a considerable convenience for anyone making 
financial  decisions that involve future receipts and payments. While econo- 
mists may be very comfortable with the process of converting nominal to real 
amounts, many people have a difficult time thinking about rates of change, real 
rates of interest, and so forth. Even among sophisticated institutional investors, 
it is remarkable how frequently projections of future returns are stated in nomi- 
nal terms and based on past experience over periods with very different rates 
of inflation. 
I will not attempt to evaluate all of these benefits of reducing inflation even 
though some of them may be as large as the improvements in the process of 
household capital accumulation that I do measure. The restricted set of benefits 
that I quantify substantially exceed (in present value at any plausible discount 
rate) the cost of getting to price stability from a low rate of inflation. 
It would be wrong, however, to go from this calculation to the conclusion 
that the reduction  in inflation  increases net welfare without considering the 
possibility that there are also advantages of continuing a low rate of inflation 
rather than having price stability. The primary gain from inflation that has been 
identified in the literature is the seigniorage that the government enjoys from 
the higher rate of money creation. This seigniorage revenue reduces the need for 
other distortionary taxes and therefore eliminates the deadweight loss that such 
taxes would entail. In addition, the real cost of servicing the national debt varies 
inversely with the rate of inflation.13  The value of these advantages of continuing 
the 2%  inflation rate will be calculated explicitly in sections 3.5 and 3.6.14 
Table 3.1 summarizes all of  the welfare changes that are discussed in the 
remaining sections of the paper. The specific assumptions and parameters val- 
ues will be discussed there. With the parameter values that seem most likely, 
the overall total  effect of  reducing  inflation from 2%  to zero, shown in the 
lower  right corner of the  table, is to reduce the annual deadweight loss by 
between 0.63 and 1.01% of GDP. 
The costs of reducing inflation and the value of lower inflation both depend 
on the institutional features of the economy, including the functioning of the 
labor and capital markets as well as the tax rules. The current analysis applies 
specifically to the United States in recent years, but the method of analysis is 
clearly applicable to other countries and times. 
13. A higher inflation rate reduces the real net cost of  debt service because the equilibrium 
government bond rate rises point for point with inflation but the inflation premium is then subject 
to tax. The net nominal interest rate therefore rises less than point for point with inflation, and the 
real net rate declines. 
14. There is also recent theoretical literature on the potential advantages of inflation in inducing 
search that improves resource allocation in imperfectly competitive markets (e.g., Benabou 1992). 
No attempt has been made to assess the possible magnitude of  the benefit of this increased search. 128  Martin Feldstein 
Table 3.1  The Net Welfare Effect of Reducing Inflation from 2% to Zero 
(changes as % of GDP) 
~  ~~~~~~ 
Welfare Effect of 
Revenue Change  Total Effect 
Direct Effect of 
Source of Change  Reduced Distortion  A  = 0.4  A  = 1.5  A = 0.4  A  =  1 .5 
Consumption timing  qsr  = 0.4  I .02 
q5,  = 0  0.73 
qs,  = 1.0  1.44 
Housing demand  0.10 
Money demand  0.02 
Debt service  NA 
Totals  qsr  = 0.4  1.14 
q5r  = 0  0.85 










-0.39  0.92  0.63 
-0.78  0.52  -0.05 
0.20  1.49  I .64 
0.45  0.22  0.55 
-0.19  -0.03  -0.17 
-0.38  -0.10  -0.38 
-0.5  I  1.01  0.63 
-0.90  0.66  -0.05 
0.08  1 .58  I .64 
Nores: A  2%  inflation rate  corresponds to a rise in  the CPI at  4%  a year. The welfare effects 
reported here are annual changes in welfare. NA = not applicable. 
3.2  The Cost of Reducing Inflation 
Although it can be argued that an unambiguous commitment to price stabil- 
ity would cause the inflation rate to decline with no loss of output, my reading 
of  the experience of countries like Germany and New Zealand suggests that 
even a long tradition of a commitment to low inflation or a contractual obliga- 
tion with strong potential penalties is insufficient to achieve a painless reduc- 
tion of inflation. For the purpose of this paper, 1 will therefore assume that the 
cost of reducing inflation can be inferred from the parameters of  a short-run 
Phillips curve based on the experience of the United States over the past two 
decades. 
Laurence Ball (1995) provides a useful survey of previous empirical work 
in this area and new estimates  of the cost of disinflation. More specifically, 
Ball estimates the cost of disinflation as the cumulative loss of GDP during the 
period when inflation is being reduced by raising the unemployment rate above 
the natural rate. He concludes that each percentage point reduction in the rate 
of inflation costs a cumulative output loss equal to between 2 and 3% of GDP. 
This implies that reducing inflation from 2% to zero has a one-time cost in the 
range of 4-6%  of GDP. 
This estimate makes no allowance for the offsetting value of leisure, home 
production, and job search among the unemployed. It also makes no  allowance 
for the possible  persistent  (“hysteresis”)  effects of job loss  that  might  be 
caused by a loss of job-specific human capital or, more generally, by an erosion 
of human capital during the period of unemployment. 
15. The relatively short duration of cyclical unemployment spells in the United States implie? 
that raising the unemployment to reduce inflation is unlikely to have a significant adverse effect 
on human capital. 129  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
Rather than trying to make a more precise adjustment in the Ball measure 
of the cost of  disinflation, I will assume the upper end of his range (6% of 
GDP) and ask whether the present value of  the gain in having price stability 
rather than 2%  inflation exceeds 6% of the initial GDP. The analysis in this 
paper implies that the answer to that question is yes and would probably be 
yes even if the cost were substantially higher. 
3.3  Inflation and the Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption 
Inflation reduces the real net of tax return to  savers in many ways. At the 
corporate (or, more generally, the business)  level, inflation reduces the value 
of depreciation allowances and therefore increases the effective tax rate. This 
lowers the rate of return that businesses can afford to pay for debt and equity 
capital. At the individual level, taxes levied on nominal capital gains and nomi- 
nal interest also cause the effective tax rate to increase with the rate of inflation. 
A reduction in the rate of return that individuals earn on their saving creates 
a welfare loss by distorting the allocation of consumption between the early 
years in life and the later years. Since the tax law creates such a distortion even 
when there is price stability, the extra distortion caused by inflation causes a 
first-order increased deadweight loss. 
As I emphasized in an earlier paper (Feldstein  1978), the deadweight loss 
that results from capital income taxes depends on the resulting distortion in the 
timing of consumption and not on the change in saving per se. Even if there is 
no change in saving, a tax-inflation induced decline in the rate of return implies 
a reduction in future consumption and therefore a deadweight loss. In this sec- 
tion, I calculate the general magnitude of the reduction in this welfare loss that 
results from lowering the rate of inflation from 2%  to zero."j 
To analyze the deadweight loss that results from a distortion of consumption 
over the individual life cycle, I consider a simple two-period model of individ- 
ual consumption. Individuals receive income when they are young. They save 
a portion, S,  of that income and consume the rest. The savings are invested in 
a portfolio that earns a real net-of-tax return of  r. At the end of T years, the 
individuals retire and consume C = (1 + r)?Y.  In this framework, saving can 
be thought of  as the expenditure (when young) to purchase  retirement  con- 
sumption at a price of p = (1 + r)-? 
Even in the absence of inflation, the effect of the tax system is to reduce 
the rate of return on saving and therefore to increase the price of retirement 
consumption. As inflation increases, the price of retirement  consumption  in- 
creases further. Before looking at specific numerical values, I present graphi- 
cally  the welfare  consequences of  these  changes in the price  of  retirement 
16. Fischer (1981) used the framework of Feldstein (1978) to assess the deadweight loss caused 
by the effect of inflation on  the return to savers. As the current analysis indicates, the problem is 
more complex than either Fischer or I recognized in those earlier studies. 130  Martin Feldstein 
consumption. Figure 3.1 shows the individual’s compensated demand for re- 
tirement consumption C as a function of  the price of retirement consumption 
at the time that saving decisions are made (p). 
In the absence of both inflation and taxes, the real rate of return implies a 
price of po and the individual chooses to save enough to generate retirement 
consumption of C,.  With no inflation, the existing structure of capital income 
taxes at the business and individual levels raises the price of  retirement con- 
sumption top,  and reduces retirement consumption to C,.  This increase in the 
price of retirement consumption causes the individual to incur the deadweight 
loss (DWL) shown as the shaded area A, that is, the amount that the individual 
would have to be compensated for the rise in the price of retirement consump- 
tion  in order to remain  at the same initial utility  level exceeds the revenue 
(REV) collected by the government by an amount equal to the area A. Raising 
the rate of inflation from zero to 2% increases the price of retirement consump- 
tion  to p2  and reduces retirement  consumption to C2. The deadweight  loss 
now increases by the trapezoidal  area C + D = (p, -  p,,)(C, - CJ  + 0.5 
The revenue effect  of  such tax  changes are generally  ignored  in  welfare 
analyses because it is assumed that any loss or gain in revenue can be offset 
by a lump-sum tax or transfer. More realistically, however, we must recognize 
that offsetting a revenue change due to a change in inflation involves distor- 
tionary taxes, and therefore each dollar or revenue gain or loss has an addi- 
tional effect on overall welfare. The net welfare effect of reducing the inflation 
rate from 2%  to zero is therefore the combination  of the traditional  welfare 
gain (the trapezoid  C + D) and the welfare gain (loss) that results from an 
increase (decrease) in tax revenue. I begin by evaluating the traditional welfare 
(P, -  PJC,  -  C,). 
P2 
Price of 
Retirement  PI 
Consumption 
Po 
C?  CI  c,, 
Retirement Consumption 
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gain  and then  calculate  the  additional  welfare effect of  the  changes in  tax 
revenue. 
3.3.  I  The Welfare Gain from Reduced Intertemporal Distortion 
The annual welfare gain  from reduced  intertemporal  distortion  is  (p, - 
CJ.  The change in retirement consumption can be approximated as C, -  C, = 
ccP < 0 is the compensated elasticity of retirement consumption with respect 
to its price as evaluated at the observed initial inflation rate of 2%). Thus the 
gain from reduced intertemporal distortion is” 
P,)(C, -  C,)  + 0.5 (P, -  P,)(C,  -  C2) = [(PI -  Po) + 0.5 (Pz -  PI)](~I  - 
(dC/dP)(P, -  PJ = C,(P,/C2)(dC/dp)(P, -  P2YP2 = C2ECp[(Pi  -  PJP21 where 
(1)  G, = [(P, -  PO)  + 0.5  (P2 -  Pi)IC2&cp[(Pl  -  P2)/P2I 
1  [(PI  -  po)/pz + 0.5 (~2  -  P~)/P~IP~C,E~~[(PI  -  ~211~21. 
Note that if  there  were  no tax-induced  distortion when  the  inflation rate is 
zero (pi  = po),  G, would simplify to the traditional triangle formula for the 
deadweight loss of a price change from p1  to p,. 
To  move from equation  1 to observable magnitudes, note that the compen- 
sated elasticity sCi, can be written  in terms of  the corresponding uncompen- 
sated elasticity qc, and the propensity to save out of exogenous income u as1* 
+ cr. 
- 
(2)  Ecp -  rlcp 
Moreover, since saving and retirement consumption are related by S = pC, 
the elasticity of retirement consumption with respect to its price and the elas- 
ticity of saving with respect to the price of retirement consumption are related 
by rlcp = rlsp -  1. Thus 
(3) 
and 
Fcp = qs,  + u - 1 
(4)  GI  =  [(PI  -  PO)/P~ + 0.5 (P, -  P~)/P,I[(P,  -  PI)/P~I 
x S2  (1 -  rls, - u), 
where S, = p2C,,  the gross saving of individuals at the early stage of the life 
cycle. 
To evaluate equation 4 requires numerical estimates of  the price of  future 
consumption at different inflation rates and without any tax, as well as esti- 
mates of gross saving, of the saving elasticity, and of the propensity to save out 
of exogenous income. 
17. This could be stated as the difference between the areas of the two deadweight loss triangles 
corresponding to prices p,  and pz.  but the expression used here presents a better approximation. 
18. This follows from the usual Slutsky decomposition:  dC/dp = {dC/dp},.,,,  - C(dC1d.y) 
where dCldy is the increase in retirement consumption induced by  an increase in exogenous in- 
come. Multiplying each term by  plC and noting that p(dC/dy) = dpCldy = dS/d.y  = u yields 
equation 2. 132  Martin Feldstein 
Inflation Rates and the Price oj  Retirement Consumption 
To calculate the price of retirement consumption, I assume the time interval 
between saving and consumption is thirty years; for example, the individual 
saves on average at age forty and then dissaves at age seventy. Thus p = (1 + 
r)-)O where the value of r depends on the tax system and the rate of inflation. 
From 1960 through 1994, the pretax real return to capital in the U.S. nonfinan- 
cial corporate sector averaged 9.2%.19 Ignoring general equilibrium effects and 
taking this as the measure of the discrete-time return per year that would pre- 
vail in the absence of taxes implies that the corresponding price of retirement 
consumption is po = (1  .092)-‘30)  = 0.071. 
Taxes paid by corporations to federal, state, and local governments equaled 
about 41% of the total pretax return during this period, leaving a real net return 
before personal taxes of 5.4% (Rippe 1995). I will take this yield difference as 
an indication of the combined effects of  taxes and inflation at 2% (i.e., mea- 
sured inflation at 4%) even though tax rules, tax rates, and inflation varied over 
this thirty-five-year interval.20  The net of tax rate of return depends not only on 
the tax at the corporate level but also on the taxes that individuals pay on that 
after-corporate-tax return, including the taxes on interest income, dividends, 
and capital gains. The effective marginal tax rate depends on the form of the 
income and on the tax status of the individual. I will summarize all of this by 
assuming a marginal “individual” tax rate of 25%. This reduces the net return 
from 5.4 to 4.05%. The analysis of the gain from reducing the equilibrium rate 
of inflation is not sensitive to the precise level of this return or to the precise 
difference between it and 9.2% pretax  return  since our concern is with the 
effect of a difference in inflation  rates on effective tax rates.  Similarly, the 
precise level of the initial effective tax rate is not important to the current calcu- 
lations since our concern is with the change in the effective tax rate that occurs 
as a result of  the change in the equilibrium  rate of  inflation.21  The price of 
retirement consumption that corresponds to this net return of  4.05%  is p2 = 
(1 .0405)-30 = 0.304, where the subscript 2 on the price indicates that this rep- 
resents the price at an inflation rate of 2%. 
Reducing the equilibrium inflation rate from 2% to zero lowers the effective 
tax rate  at both  the  corporate  and individual  levels. At  the  corporate  level, 
changes in the equilibrium inflation rate alter the effective tax rate by changing 
the value of depreciation allowances and by  changing the value of the deduc- 
tion of interest payments.  Because the depreciation  schedule that is allowed 
19. This 9.2% is the ratio of profits before all taxes (including property taxes as well as income 
taxes) plus real net interest payments to the replacement  value of  the capital  stock. Feldstein, 
Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux (1983) describe the method of calculation, and Rippe (1995) brings 
the calculation up to date. Excluding the property taxes would reduce this return by  about 0.7 
percentage points; see Poterba and Samwick (1995). 
20. The average rate of  measured inflation during this period was actually 4.7‘6, implying an 
average “true” inflation rate of 2.7%. 
21. Some explicit sensitivity calculations are presented below. 133  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
for calculating  taxable profits  is defined in  nominal terms,  a higher rate of 
inflation reduces the present value of  the depreciation and thereby increases 
the effective tax rate.22  Auerbach (1978) showed that this relation can be ap- 
proximated by a rule of thumb that increases taxable profits by 0.57 percentage 
points  for  each  percentage  point  of  inflation.  With  a  marginal  corporate- 
income-tax rate of  35%, a 2-percentage-point  decline in inflation raises the 
net of  tax return through this channel by 0.35(0.57)(0.02)  = 0.0040 or 0.40 
percentage points.23 
The interaction of  the interest deduction  and inflation moves the after-tax 
yield in the opposite direction. If each percentage point of inflation raises the 
nominal corporate borrowing rate by  1 percentage point,24  the real pretax cost 
of borrowing is unchanged but the corporation gets an additional deduction in 
calculating taxable income. With a typical debt-capital ratio of 40% and a stat- 
utory corporate tax rate of 35%, a 2% decline in inflation raises the effective 
tax rate by 0.35(0.40)(0.02) = 0.0028 or 0.28 percentage points. 
The net effect of going from a 2%  inflation rate to price stability is therefore 
to raise the rate of return after corporate taxes by 0.12 percentage points, from 
the 5.40% calculated above to 5.52%.2s 
Consider next how the lower inflation rate affects the taxes at the individual 
level. Applying the 25% tax rate to the 5.52% return net of the corporate tax 
implies a net yield of 4.14%, an increase of 0.09 percentage points in net yield 
to the individual because of the changes in taxation  at the corporate level. In 
addition, because individual income taxes are levied on nominal interest pay- 
ments and nominal capital gains, a reduction in the rate of  inflation further 
reduces the effective tax rate and raises the real after-tax rate of return. 
The portion of  this relation that is associated with the taxation  of nominal 
interest at the level of the individual can be approximated in a way that paral- 
lels the effect at the corporate level. If each percentage point of inflation raises 
22. See Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978) for an analytic discussion of the effect of  infla- 
tion on the value of depreciation allowances. 
23. It might be argued that Congress changes depreciation rates in response to changes in infla- 
tion in order to keep the real present value of depreciation allowances unchanged. But although 
Congress did enact more rapid depreciation schedules in the early 1980s, the decline in inflation 
since that time has not been offset by  lengthening depreciation schedules and has resulted in a 
reduction in the effective rate of corporate income taxes. 
24. This famous Irving Fisher hypothesis of a constant real interest rate is far from inevitable 
in an  economy with  a complex nonneutral tax  structure. For example, if  the only nonneutrality 
were the ability of  corporations to deduct nominal interest payments and all investment were fi- 
nanced by debt at the margin, the nominal interest rate would rise by  1/( 1 -  T) times the change 
in inflation, where T is the statutory corporate tax rate. This effect is diminished, however, by  the 
combination of historic cost depreciation, equity finance, international capital flows and the tax 
rules at the level of the individual. (See Feldstein 1983, 1995d; Hartman 1979). Despite the theo- 
retical ambiguity, the evidence suggests that these various tax rules and investor behavior interact 
in practice in the United States to keep the real pretax rate of interest approximately unchanged 
when the rate of inflation changes; see Mishkin (1992). 
25. Note that although the margin of uncertainty about the 5.5% exceeds the calculated change 
in return of 0.12%, the conclusions of the current analysis are not sensitive to the precise level of 
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the nominal interest rate by  1 percentage point, the individual investors’ real 
pretax return on debt is unchanged but the after-tax return falls by the product 
of  the statutory marginal tax rate and the change in inflation. Assuming the 
same 40% debt share at the individual level as I assumed for the corporate 
capital  stockzh and  a  25%  weighted  average  individual  marginal  tax  rate 
implies  that  a  2%  decline  in  inflation  lowers  the  effective  tax  rate  by 
0.25(0.40)(0.02) = 0.0020 or 0.20 percentage points. 
Although the effective tax rate on the dividend return to the equity portion 
of individual capital ownership is not affected by inflation (except, of course, 
at the corporate level), a higher rate of inflation increases the taxation of capital 
gains. Although capital gains are now taxed at the same rate as other invest- 
ment income (up to a maximum capital gain rate of 28% at the federal level), 
the effective tax rate is lower because the tax is only levied when the stock is 
sold. As an approximation, I will therefore assume a 10% effective marginal 
tax rate on capital gains. In equilibrium, each percentage-point increase in the 
price level raises the nominal value of the capital stock by  1 percentage point. 
Since the  nominal  value  of  the  liabilities remains  unchanged,  the  nominal 
value of the equity rises by  1/(  1 -  b)  percentage points where b is the debt-to- 
capital ratio. With b = 0.4 and an effective marginal tax on nominal capital 
gains of  Og = 0.1, a 2-percentage-point decline in the rate of inflation raises 
the real after-tax rate of return on equity by Og[  1/(  1 -  b)]d.rr = 0.0033 or 0.33 
percentage points. However, since equity represents only 60% of  the individu- 
al’s  portfolio, the  lower effective capital gains tax  raises  the overall  rate of 
return by only 60% of this 0.33 percentage points of 0.20 percentage points.” 
Combining the debt and capital gains effects implies that reducing the infla- 
tion rate by 2 percentage points reduces the effective tax rate at the individual- 
investor level by the equivalent of 0.40 percentage points. The real net return 
to the individual saver is thus 4.54%, up 0.49 percentage points from the return 
when the inflation rate is 2 percentage points higher. The implied price of re- 
tirement consumption is p,  = (1.0454)-’O  = 0.264. 
Substituting these values for the price of retirement consumption into equa- 
tion 4 implies2R 
(5)  G,  = 0.092 S, (1 -  qs, -  a). 
26. This ignores individual investments in government debt. Bank deposits backed by  noncor- 
porate bank assets (e.g., home mortgages) can be ignored as being within the household sector. 
27. The assumption that the share of debt in the individual’s portfolio is the same as the share 
of debt in corporate capital causes the 1/(  1  ~  b)  term to drop out of the calculation. More generally, 
the effect of  inflation on the individual’s rate of  return depends on the difference between the 
shares of debt in corporate capital and in the individual’s portfolios. 
28. To test the sensitivity of this result to the assumption about the pretax return and the effective 
corporate tax rate, I recalculated the retirement consumption prices using alternatives to the as- 
sumed values of 9.2% for the pretax return and 0.41 for the combined effective corporate tax rate. 
Raising the pretax rate of return from 9.2% to  10% only changed the deadweight loss value in 
equation 5 from 0.092 to 0.096; lowering the pretax rate of return from 9.2% to 8.4% lowered the 
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The Saving Rate and Saving Behavior 
The value  of  S,  in equation  5 represents  the saving during preretirement 
years  at the existing rate of  inflation. This is, of  course, different from the 
national income account measure of personal saving since personal saving is 
the difference between the saving of the younger  savers and the dissaving of 
retired dissavers. 
One strategy for approximating the value of S, is to use the relation between 
S,  and the national income account measure of personal saving in an economy 
in steady-state growth. In the simple overlapping-generations model with sav- 
ing proportional to income, saving grows at a rate of n + g, where n is the rate 
of  population growth and g is the growth in per capita wages. This implies 
that the saving of the young savers is (1 + n + g)'times  the dissaving of the 
older dis~avers.~~ 
Thus net personal saving (S,)  in the economy is related to the saving of the 
young (S,) according to 
(6)  S, = S, -  (1 + n + g)-'S,. 
The value of S,  that we need is conceptually equivalent to S, . Real aggregate 
wage income grew in the United States at a rate of 2.6% between  1960 and 
1994. Using  n + g = 0.026 and T = 30 implies that S, = 1.86 S,.  If  we 
take personal saving to be approximately 5% of GDP, this implies that S, = 
0.09 GDP.30 
If the propensity to consume out of exogenous income (u) is the same as 
the propensity to consume out of wage income, u = S,/(a * GDP), where a is 
the share of wages in GDP. With a = 0.75, this simplies u = 0.12. 
The final term to be evaluated in order to calculate the welfare gain de- 
scribed in equation  5 is the elasticity of  saving with respect to the price of 
retirement consumption. Since the price of retirement consumption is given by 
p = (1 + r)-T,  the uncompensated elasticity of savings with respect to the price 
of retirement consumption can be restated as an elasticity with respect to the 
real rate of  return: -qsr = -  rT qsp  /( 1 + r).  Thus equation 5 becomes 
(7)  G, = 0.092 S,  (I + (1 + r)  qJrT -  u). 
Estimating the elasticity of saving with respect to the real net rate of return 
has proven to be very difficult because of the problems involved in measuring 
a pretax return of 9.2 only shifted the deadweight loss value in equation 5 from 0.092 to 0.096. 
These calculations confirm that the effect of changing the equilibrium inflation rate is not sensitive 
to the precise values assumed for the pretax rate of return and the effective baseline tax rate. 
29. Note that the spending of the older retirees includes both the dissaving of their earlier saving 
and the income that they have earned on their saving. Net personal saving is only the difference 
between the saving of the savers and the dissaving of the dissavers. 
30. This framework can be extended to recognize that the length of  the work period is roughly 
twice as long as the length of  the retirement period without appreciably changing this result. 136  Martin Feldstein 
changes in expected real net-of-tax returns and in holding constant in the time- 
series data the  other factors that  affect  savings. The large  literature on this 
subject generally finds that a higher real rate of return either raises the saving 
rate or has no affect at all.3’ In their classic study of the welfare costs of U.S. 
taxes,  Ballard,  Shoven, and Whalley  (1985) assumed  a  saving elasticity of 
qsr  = 0.40. I will take this as the benchmark value for the current study. In this 
case, equation 7 implies (with r = 0.04) 
(8)  G, = 0.092 S, (1 + (1 + r)  qs,/rT -  a) 
= 0.092 (0.09) (1 + 0.42/1.2 -  0.12) GDP = 0.0102 GDP. 
The annual gain from reduced distortion of consumption is equal to 1.02% of 
GDP. This figure is shown in the first row of table 3.1. 
To assess the sensitivity of this estimate to the value of qs,,  I also examine 
two other values. The limiting case in which changes in real interest rates have 
no effect on saving, that is, that qsr  = 0, implies’’ 
(9)  G, = 0.092 S2 (1 + (1 + r)  qJrT -  a) 
= 0.092 (0.09) (1 - .12) GDP = 0.0073 GDP, 
that is, an annual welfare gain equal to 0.73 percentage points of GDP. 
If  we assume instead that qyr  = 1.0, that is, that increasing the real rate of 
return from 4.0% to 4.5% (the estimated effect of dropping the inflation rate 
from 2% to zero) raises the saving rate 9% to 10.1%,  the welfare gain is G, = 
0.0144 GDP. 
These calculations suggest that the traditional welfare effect on the timing 
of  consumption  of  reducing the inflation  rate from 2% to zero is probably 
bounded between 0.73% of GDP and 1.44% of GDP. These figures are shown 
in the second and third rows of table 3.1. 
3.3.2  The Revenue Effects of a Lower Inflation Rate Causing a Lower 
Effective Tax on Investment Income 
As I noted earlier, the traditional assumption in welfare calculations, and the 
one that is implicit in the calculation of section 3.3.1 is that any revenue effect 
can be offset by lump-sum taxes and transfer. When this is not true, as it clearly 
is not in the U.S. economy, an increase in tax revenue has a further welfare 
advantage because it permits reduction in other distortionary taxes while a loss 
of tax revenue implies a welfare cost of using other distortionary taxes to re- 
place the lost revenue. In this section, I calculate the effect on tax revenue paid 
by the initial generation of having price stability rather than a 2% inflation rate 
and discuss the corresponding effect on economic welfare. 
Reducing the equilibrium rate of inflation raises the real return to savers and 
31. See among others Blinder (1975); Boskin  (1978); Evans (1983); Feldstein  (1995~);  Hall 
32. This is a limiting case in the sense that empirical estimates of T~~  are almost always positive. 
(1987); Makin (1987); Mankiw (1978); and Wright (1969). 
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therefore reduces the price of retirement consumption. The effect of this on 
government revenue depends on the change in retirement consumption implied 
by the compensated demand curve.33  At the initial level of retirement consump- 
tion, reducing the price of future consumption from p2  to p,  reduces revenue 
(evaluated as of the initial time) by  (p, -  p,)C,. If  the fall in  the price  of 
retirement consumption causes retirement consumption to increase from C2  to 
C,, the government collects additional revenue equal to (p, -  p,)(C, -  C,). 
Even if C,  < C,, the overall net effect on revenue, (p, -  po)(C, -  C,)  -  (p2 
-  p,)C2,  can in theory be either positive or negative. 
In the present case, the change in revenue can be calculated as 
d REV = (P, -  p,)(C, - (2,)  -  (p2  -  pI)C2  (10) 
= (PI -  PO)(dC/dP)(P, -  P,) -  (P2 -  PJC, 
= (PI -  PONP, -  P,)(dC/dP)(P,  1 C,)(C, / P2) 
= (PI -  Po)(P, -  PZ)"CP(C,  lP2) -  (P2 -  PI)C? 
-  (P, -  PJC, 
Replacing p2C2  by S2 and recalling from equation 3 that eQ = qsp  + u -  1 
yields 
(11)  d REV = S2  {[(PI  -  po)/PJI[(Pz -  P~)/Pz)I 
x (1 -  rls,  - 0)  -  (P2 -  PI)/P21. 
Substituting the prices derived in  the previous section (po  = 0.071; p, = 
0.264; and p2 = 0.304) implies 
(12)  d REV = S, (0.0836 (1 -  qsp  -  U) -  0.1316} 
= S, (0.0836 (1 + (1 + r)  qJrT - a) -  0.1316). 
With IJ = 0.12 (as derived in section 3.3.1), the benchmark case of qsr = 0.4 
implies dREV = -0.029  S, or, with Sz  = 0.09 GDP as derived above, dREV = 
The limiting case of  qsr  = 0 implies dREV = -0.0052  GDP while qs7  = 
1  .O  implies dREV = 0.001 3 GDP. 
Thus, depending on the uncompensated elasticity of saving with respect to 
the rate of interest, the revenue effect of  shifting from 2% inflation to price 
stability can be either negative or positive. 
3.3.3 
-0.0026  GDI? 
The Welfare Gain from the Effects of Reduced Inflation on 
Consumption Timing 
We can now combine the traditional welfare gain (GI of equations 8 and 9) 
with the welfare consequences of the revenue change (dREV of equations 11 
33. The compensated demand curve is used because, for taxpayers as a whole, other taxes are 
adjusted to keep total revenue constant. Although there is no exact compensation for each taxpayer, 
the compensated  demand  curve is  much more nearly appropriate than the uncompensated  de- 
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and 12). If each dollar of revenue that must be raised from other taxes involves 
a deadweight loss of  A, the net welfare gain of  shifting from 2% inflation to 
price stability is 
(1  34 
Similarly, 
(1  3b) 
and 
(13c)  G,  = [0.0144 + O.O013A]CDP  if rlS, = 1.0. 
G, = [0.0102 -  0.0026AlGDP  if qXr  = 0.4. 
G, = [0.0073 -  0.0052AJGDP  if qsr  = 0. 
The value  of  A  depends on the change  in  taxes  that  is used  to adjust  to 
changes in revenue. Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) used a computable 
general equilibrium model to calculate the effect of increasing all taxes in the 
same proportion and concluded that the deadweight loss per dollar of revenue 
was between 30 cents and 55 cents, depending on parameter  assumptions. I 
represent this range by  A = 0.40. Using this implies that the net welfare gain 
of reducing inflation from 2% to zero equals 0.92% of GDP in the benchmark 
case of qsr  = 0.4. The welfare effect of reduced revenue (-0.10%  of GDP) is 
shown in the second column of table 3.1 and the combined welfare effect of 
0.92% of GDP is shown in column 4 of table 3.1. 
In the other two limiting cases, the net welfare gain corresponding to A  = 
0.4 is 0.52% of GDP with q5r  = 0 and  1.49% of GDP with qsr  = 1.0. These 
are shown in the second and third rows of column 4 of table 3.1. 
The analysis of Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley  ( 1985  j  estimates the dead- 
weight loss of higher tax rates on the basis of the distortion in labor supply and 
saving. No account is taken of the effect of higher tax rates on tax avoidance 
through spending on deductible items or receiving income in nontaxable forms 
(fringe benefits,  nicer working conditions, etc.). In a recent paper (Feldstein 
1995a), I showed that these forms of  tax avoidance as well as the traditional 
reduction  of  earned income can be included in the  calculation of  the  dead- 
weight loss of changes in income tax rates by using the compensated elasticity 
of taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate. Based on an analysis of 
the experience of  high-income  taxpayers  before  and  after the  1986 tax  rate 
reductions, I estimated that elasticity to be  1.04 (Feldstein 1995b). Using this 
elasticity in the  National Bureau of  Economic  Research TAXSIM model,  I 
then estimated that a  10% increase in all individual income tax rates would 
cause a deadweight loss of about $44 billion at 1994 income levels; since the 
corresponding revenue increase would be $21 billion, the implied value of  A 
is 2.06. 
A subsequent study (Feldstein and Feenberg  1996) based on the  1993 tax 
rate increases suggests a somewhat smaller compensated  elasticity of about 
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ence may reflect the fact that the 1993 study is based on the experience during 
the first year only, I will be conservative and assume a lower deadweight loss 
value of A  = 1.5. 
With  A  = 1.5, equations  13a through  13c imply a wider range of  welfare 
gain estimates: reducing inflation from 2%  to zero increases the annual level 
of welfare by 0.63% of GDP in the benchmark case of qsr = 0.4. With qs,  = 
0,  the net effect is a very small loss of 0.05% of GDP, while with qsr = 1.0 the 
net effect is a substantial gain of  1.64% of GDP. These values are shown in 
column 5 of table 3.1. 
These are of course just the annual effects of inflation on savers’ intertempo- 
ral allocation of consumption. Before turning to the other effects of inflation, 
it is useful to say a brief word about nonsavers. 
3.3.4  Nonsavers 
A striking fact about American households is that a large fraction of house- 
holds have no financial assets at all. Almost 20% of U.S.  households with heads 
age fifty-five to sixty-four had no net financial assets at all in  1991 and 50% 
of  such households had assets under $8,300; these figures exclude mortgage 
obligations from financial liabilities. 
The absence of substantial saving does not imply that individuals are irratio- 
nal or unconcerned  with the need to finance retirement consumption.  Since 
Social Security benefits replace more than two-thirds of after-tax income for a 
worker who has had median lifetime earnings and many employees can antici- 
pate private pension payments in addition to Social Security, the absence of 
additional financial assets may be consistent with rational life-cycle behavior. 
For these individuals, zero saving represents a constrained optimum,34 
In the presence of private pensions and Social Security, the shift from low 
inflation to price stability may cause some of these households to save and that 
increase in saving may increase their welfare and raise total tax revenue. Since 
the welfare gain calculated that I reported earlier in this section is proportional 
to the amount of saving by preretirement workers, it ignores the potential gain 
to current nonsavers. 
Although the large number of nonsavers and their high aggregate income 
imply that this effect could be important, I have no way to judge how the in- 
creased rate of return would actually affect behavior. I therefore leave this out 
of the calculations, only noting that it implies that my estimate of the gain from 
lower inflation is to this extent undervalued. 
34. The observed small financial balances of such individuals may be precautionary balances 
or merely transitory funds that will soon be spent. It would be desirable to refine the calculations 
of this section to recognize that some of the annual national income account savings are for precau- 
tionary purposes. Since there is no satisfactory closed-form expression relating the demand for 
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3.4  Inflationary Distortion of the Demand for 
Owner-Occupied Housing 
Owner-occupied housing receives special treatment under the personal in- 
come tax.35  Mortgage-interest payments and local property taxes are deducted, 
but no tax is imposed on the implicit “rental” return on the capital invested in 
the property. This treatment would induce too much consumption of housing 
services even in the absence of inflation. 
Inflation reduces the cost of owner-occupied housing services in two ways. 
The one that has been the focus of the literature on this subject (e.g., Rosen 
1985) is the increased deduction of the nominal mortgage-interest  payments. 
Since the real rate remains unchanged while the tax deduction  increases, the 
subsidy increases and the net cost of housing  services declines. In addition, 
inflation  increases  the demand for owner-occupied housing  by  reducing  the 
return on investments in the debt and equity of corporations. 
Reducing  the rate of  inflation  therefore  reduces  the deadweight  loss that 
results from excessive demand for housing services. In addition, a lower infla- 
tion rate reduces the loss of  tax revenue; if raising revenue involves a dead- 
weight loss, this reduction  in the loss of  tax revenue to the housing subsidy 
provides an additional welfare gain. 
3.4.1  The Welfare Gain from Reduced Distortion of Housing Consumption 
In the absence of taxes, the implied rental cost of housing per dollar of hous- 
ing capital (R,) reflects the opportunity cost of  the resources: 
(14)  R, = p + m  + 6, 
where p is the real return on capital in the nonhousing sector, m is the cost of 
maintenance  per dollar of housing capital, and 6 is the rate of depreciation. 
With p = 0.092 (the average pretax real rate of return on capital in the nonfi- 
nancial corporate sector between  1960 and 1994), m = 0.02, and 6 = 0.02,’6 
R, = 0.132; the rental  cost of owner-occupied  housing would be  13.2 cents 
per dollar of housing capital. 
Consider in  contrast  the  corresponding  implied  rental  cost per dollar  of 
housing  capital  under the existing  tax  rules  for a couple who itemize  their 
tax return: 
(15)  RZ  = p.( 1 -0)i,,, + (1 - p.)(r,?  + T) 
+ (1 - 0)~~  + m + 6 -  T, 
where RZ  indicates that it is the rental cost of  an itemizer; p. is the ratio of the 
mortgage to the value of the house; 0 is the marginal income tax rate; in, is the 
35. This seclion benefits from the analysis in Poterba  (1  984, 1992) but differs from the frame- 
36. These values of m  and 6 are from Poterba ( 1992). 
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interest rate paid on the mortgage; rn is the real net rate of return available on 
portfolio investments; T,,  is the rate of property tax;”  rn and 6 are as defined 
above; and  IT  is the rate of  inflation  (assumed to be the same for goods in 
general and for house prices). This equation says the annual cost of owning a 
dollar’s worth of housing is the sum of  the net-of-tax mortgage-interest pay- 
ments p.[( 1 -  0>i,] plus the opportunity cost of the equity invested in the house 
((1 - p)(r, + IT)) plus  the local property  tax  reduced  by  the value of the 
corresponding tax deduction ((  1 -  0)7,) plus the maintenance (m)  and depreci- 
ation (6) less the inflationary gain on the property (T). 
In 1991, the year for which other data on housing used in this section were 
derived, the rate on conventional  mortgages was  i,  = 0.072 and the rate of 
inflation was T  = 0.01.38  The assumption that dimld.rr  = 1 implies that i,  would 
be 0.082 at an inflation rate of  IT = 0.02.39  Section 3.3 derived a value of r,, = 
0.0405 for the real net return on a portfolio of debt and equity securities when 
IT = 0.02. With a typical mortgage-to-value  ratio among itemizers of  p = 
0.5,4O a marginal tax rate of 0 = 0.25, a property tax rate of  T,,  = 0.025, m = 
0.02, and 6 = 0.02, the rental cost per dollar of housing capital for an itemizer 
when the inflation rate is 2%  is RI, = 0.0998. Thus the combination of the tax 
rules and a 2% inflation rate reduces the rental cost from 13.2 cents per dollar 
of housing capital to 9.98 cents per dollar of housing capital. 
Consider now the effect of a decrease in the rate of inflation on this implicit 
rental cost of owner-occupied housing: 
(16)  dRI/d.rr = p(1 -  0) di,,,/d.rr + (1 - p) d(rn  + n)ldn -  1. 
Section 3.3 showed that if each percentage-point increase in the rate of infla- 
tion raises the rate of interest by  1 percentage point, the real net rate of return 
on a portfolio of corporate equity and debt decreases from r, = 0.0454 at IT = 
0 to r, = 0.0405 at IT = 0.02, that is, dr,,ld.sr = -0.245  and d(r, + IT) I d.rr = 
0.755. Thus, with 0 = 0.25, dRIldn = 0.75 p + 0.755 (1 -  p) - 1. For an 
itemizing homeowner with a mortgage-to-value ratio of  p.  = 0.5, dRIld.rr = 
-0.25.  Since RI, = 0.0998 at 2%  inflation, dRIldr = -0.25  implies that RI, = 
0,1048 at zero inflation. The lower rate of inflation implies a higher rental cost 
per unit of housing capital and therefore a smaller distortion. 
Before calculating the deadweight loss effects of the reduced inflation, it is 
37. Following Poterba (1992), I assume that T~ = 0.025. 
38. The CPI rose by 3.1% from December 1990 to December 1991, implying a “true” inflation 
rate of  1.1 %. While previous rates were higher, subsequent inflation rates have been lower. 
39. The assumption that dild  IT  =  I  is the same assumption made in section 3.3. See note 24 
above for the reason that I use this approximation. 
40. The relevant  ratio is not that on new mortgages or on the overall stock of  all mortgages 
but on the stock of mortgages of itemizing taxpayers. The Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy 
indicate that the ratio of  home-mortgage debt to the value of owner-occupied real estate has in- 
creased to 43% in  1994. I use a higher value to reflect the fact that not all homeowners are item- 
izers and that those who do itemize are likely to have higher mortgage-to-value ratios. The results 
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necessary to derive the corresponding expressions for homeowners who do not 
itemize their deductions. For such nonitemizers mortgage-interest payments 
and the property tax payments are no longer tax deductible, implying that-" 
(17)  RN = pi,,,  + (1 -  ~)(r,~  + v) + T,, + m + 6 -  IT. 
The parametric assumptions made for itemizers, modified only by assuming a 
lower mortgage-to-value ratio among nonitemizers of IJ. = 0.2, implies RN, = 
0.1098 and RN, = 0.1137. Both values are higher than the corresponding val- 
ues for itemizers, but both imply substantial distortions that are reduced when 
the rate of inflation declines from 2% to zero. 
Figure 3.2 shows the nature of the welfare gain from reducing inflation for 
taxpayers who itemize. The figure presents  the  compensated  demand  curve 
relating the quantity of  housing capital demanded to the rental cost of such 
housing. With no taxes, R, = 0.132 and the amount of housing demanded is 
H,.  The combination of the existing tax rules at zero inflation reduces the rental 
cost to R, = 0.1048 and increases housing demand to H,.  Since the real pretax 
cost of providing housing capital is R,,  the tax-inflation combination implies a 
deadweight loss shown by area A, that is, the area between the cost of provid- 
ing the additional housing  and the demand curve. A rise in  inflation to 2% 
reduces the rental cost of housing further to RZ,  = 0.0998 and increases the 
demand for housing to H2.  The additional deadweight loss is the area C + D 
between the real pretax cost of providing the increased housing and the value 
to the users as represented by the demand curve. 
Thus, the reduction in the deadweight loss that results from reducing the 
distortion  to housing  demand  when  the  inflation  rate  declines  from  2%  to 
zero is 
(18)  G, = (R, -  R,)  (H, -  HI)  + 0.5 (R, -  R2)  (H, -  HI). 
With a linear approximation, 
G, = (R, -  R,)(dH/dR)(R,  -  R,) + 0.5 (R, -  RJ(dh/dR) 
(19)  x  (R, -  R,) 
= -  (RJH,) (dH//dR) [(R, -  R,)/R,I[(R,  -  RJRJ 
+ 0.5 (R, -  R,)2R,2)R,H,. 
Writing  E,  = -(R,/H,)(dH/dR)  for the absolute value of  the  compensated 
elasticity of housing demand with respect to the rental price (at the observed 
values of observed values of R, and H,)  and substituting the rental values for 
an itemizing taxpayer yields 
(20)  GI, = eHR  ((0.273)(0.050) + 0.5(0.050)2)  R12HI, 
= 0.0149 E,,RI~HI,. 
41. This formulation assumes that taxpayers who do not itemize mortgage deductions do not 
itemize at all and therefore do not deduct property tax payments. Some taxpayers may  in fact 
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A similar calculation for nonitemizing homeowners yields 
(21)  GN, = 0.0065~,,,RN,HN, 
Combining these two on the assumption that the compensated elasticities of 
demand are the same for itemizers  and nonitemizers  gives the total welfare 
gain from the reduced distortion of housing demand that results from reducing 
equilibrium inflation from 2% to zero: 
(22)  G, = cHR  [0.0149RI,H12 + 0.0065RN2HN,]. 
Since the calculations of the rental rates take into account the mortgage-to- 
value ratios, the relevant measures of HI, and HN, are the total market values 
of the owner-occupied  housing of  itemizers and nonitemizers.  In  1991, there 
were 60 million owner-occupied housing units and 25 million taxpayers who 
itemized mortgage  deduction^.^^ Since the total 1991 value of owner-occupied 
real estate of $6,440 billion includes more than just single-family homes (e.g., 
two-family homes and farms), I take the value of owner-occupied homes (in- 
cluding the owner-occupiers’  portion of two-family homes) to be $6,000 bil- 
lion. The Internal Revenue Service reported that the tax revenue reductions in 
199 1 due to mortgage deductions were $42 billion, implying approximately 
$160 billion  of  mortgage  deductions and therefore  about  $2,000 billion  of 
mortgages. The mortgage-to-value ratio among itemizers of mlv = 0.5 implies 
that the market value of housing owned by itemizers is HI, = $4,000 billion. 
This implies  that  the  value  of  housing  owned by  nonitemizers  is HN,  = 
$2,000 billion. 
Substituting these estimates into equation 22 (with RI, = 0.0998 and RN, = 
0.1098) implies that 
42. The difference between these two figures reflects the fact that many homeowners do not 
itemize mortgage deductions (because they have such small mortgages that they benefit more from 
using the standard deduction or have no mortgage at all) and that many homeowners own more 
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(23)  G, = $7.4~~~  billion. 
Using Rosen’s estimate (1985) of cHR  = 0.8 implies that this gain from reduc- 
ing the inflation rate is $5.9 billion  at  1991 levels. Since the  1991 GDP was 
$5,723 billion, this gain is 0.10% of GDP. 
3.4.2  The Revenue Effects of Lower Inflation on the Subsidy to Owner- 
Occupied Housing 
The G, gain is based on the traditional assumption that changes in tax reve- 
nue do not affect economic welfare because they can be offset by other lump- 
sum taxes and transfers. The more realistic  assumption that increases in tax 
revenue  permit reductions in other distortionary taxes implies that it is im- 
portant to calculate also the reduced tax subsidy of housing that results from a 
lower rate of inflation. 
The magnitude of  the revenue change depends on the extent to which the 
reduction in inflation shifts capital from owner-occupied housing to the busi- 
ness sector. To estimate this, I use the compensated elasticity of housing with 
respect to the rental value,43  sHK = 0.8. The 5% increase in the rental price of 
owner-occupied housing for itemizers from RI, = 0.0998 at T = 0.02 to RI, = 
0.1048 at zero inflation implies a 4% decline in the equilibrium stock of owner- 
occupied housing, from $4,000 billion to $3,840 billion (at 1991 levels). Simi- 
larly, for nonitemizers, the 3.6% increase in the rental price from RN, = 0.1098 
at T = 0.02 to RN, = 0.1137 at zero inflation implies a 2.9% decline in their 
equilibrium stock of  owner-occupied housing, from $2,000 billion to $1,942 
billion (at 1991 levels). 
Consider first the reduced subsidy on the $3,840 billion of remaining hous- 
ing  stock  owned  by  itemizing  taxpayers.  Maintaining  the  assumption  of  a 
mortgage-to-value ratio of p = 0.5 implies total mortgages of  $1,920 billion 
on this housing capital. The 2-percentage-point decline in the rate of inflation 
reduces mortgage-interest  payments by  $38.4 billion  and,  assuming  a 25% 
marginal tax rate, increases tax revenue by $9.6 billion. 
The shift of capital from owner-occupied housing to the business sector af- 
fects revenue in three ways. First, the itemizers lose the mortgage deduction 
and property tax  deduction  on the  $160 billion  of  reduced  housing capital. 
The reduced capital corresponds to mortgages of $80 billion and, at the initial 
inflation rate of 2%, of mortgage interest deductions of  8.2% of this $80 bil- 
lion, or $6.6 billion. The reduced  stock of owner-occupied  housing also re- 
duces property tax deductions by 2.5% of $160 billion of forgone housing, or 
$4 billion. Combining these two reductions in itemized deductions ($10.6 bil- 
lion) and applying a marginal tax rate of  25% implies a revenue gain of $2.6 
billion. 
Second, the increased capital in the business sector ($160 billion from item- 
izers plus  $58 billion  from nonitemizers) earns a pretax  return  of  9.2% but 
43. I  use the compensated  elasticity because other taxes are adjusted to keep  total  revenue 
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provides a net-of-tax yield to investors of only 4.54% when the inflation rate 
is zero. The difference is the tax collections of 4.66% on the additional $218 
billion of business capital, or $10.2 billion of additional revenue. 
Third, the reduced housing capital causes a loss of  property  tax revenue 
equal to 2.5% of the $218 billion reduction in housing capital, or $5.4 billion. 
Combining these three effects on revenue implies  a net revenue gain of 
$16.9 billion, or 0.30% of GDP (at 1991 levels). 
3.4.3  The Welfare Gain from the Housing-Sector Effects of Reduced 
Equilibrium Inflation 
The total welfare gain from the effects of lower equilibrium inflation on the 
housing sector is the sum of (1) the traditional welfare gain from the reduced 
distortion to housing consumption, 0.10% of GDP; and (2) the welfare conse- 
quences of the $16.9 billion revenue gain, a revenue gain of 0.30% of GDP. If 
each dollar of revenue raised from other taxes involves a deadweight loss of A, 
this total welfare gain of shifting from 4% inflation to 2% inflation is 
(24)  G,  = [O.OOlO + .0030A] GDP. 
The conservative Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) estimate of A = 0.4 
implies that the total welfare gain of reducing inflation from 2% to zero is 0.22 
% of GDP. With the value of A = 1.5 implied by the behavioral estimates for 
the effect of an across-the-board increase in all personal income tax rates, the 
total welfare gain of  reducing inflation from 2% to zero is 0.55% of GDP. 
These figures are shown in row 4 of table 3.1. 
Before combining this with the gain from the change in the taxation of sav- 
ings and comparing the sum to the cost of reducing inflation, I turn to two 
other ways in which a lower equilibrium rate of inflation affects economic 
welfare through the government’s budget constraint. 
3.5  Seigniorage and the Distortion of Money Demand 
An  increase  in  inflation  raises  the  cost  of  holding  non-interest-bearing 
money balances and therefore reduces the demand for such balances below the 
optimal level. Although the resulting deadweight loss of inflation has been the 
primary focus of the literature on the welfare effects of inflation since Bailey’s 
pioneering paper (1956), the effect on money demand of reducing the inflation 
rate from 2% to zero is small relative to the other effects that have been dis- 
cussed in this paper.44 
This section follows the framework of sections 3.3 and 3.4 by looking first 
44. Although  the annual effect  is extremely  small, it  is a perpetual  effect. As  I  argued  in 
Feldstein (1979), in a growing economy a perpetual gain of even a very small fraction of GDP 
may outweigh the cost of reducing inflation if the appropriate discount rate is low enough relative 
to the rate of aggregate economic growth. In the context of the current paper, however, the welfare 
effect of the reduction in money demand is very small relative to the welfare effects that occur 
because of the interaction of inflation and the tax laws. 146  Martin Feldstein 
at the distortion of demand for money and then at the revenue consequences 
of the inflation “tax” on the holding of money balances. 
3.5.1  The Welfare Effects of Distorting the Demand for Money 
As Milton Friedman (1969) has noted, since there is no real cost to increas- 
ing the quantity of money, the optimal inflation rate is such that it completely 
eliminates the cost to the individual of  holding  money balances, that is, the 
inflation rate should be such that the nominal interest rate is zero. In an econ- 
omy with no taxes on capital income, the optimal inflation rate would therefore 
be the negative of the real rate of return on capital: n* = -  p. More generally, 
if we recognize the existence of taxes, the optimal inflation rate is such that the 
nominal after-tax return on alternative financial assets is zero. 
Recall that at n = 0.02 the real net return on the debt-equity portfolio is r,, = 
0.0405 and that dr,,/dn = -0.245.  The optimal inflation rate in this context is 
such that r,, + r = 0.4s  Figure 3.3 illustrates the reduction in the deadweight 
loss that results  if the inflation rate is reduced  from n = 0.02 to 0, thereby 
reducing  the  opportunity costs of  holding  money  balances  from  r,, + n = 
0.0605 to the value of r,, at n = 0, that is. r,, = 0.0454. Since the opportunity 
cost of supplying money is zero, the welfare gain from reducing inflation is 
the area C + D between the money demand curve and the zero opportunity- 
cost line: 
G,  0.0454 (MI -  M,) + 0.5 (0.0605 -  0.0454) (M, -  MJ 
(25)  = 0.0530 (MI -  M2) 
= -0.0530  [dM/d(r,,  + n)]  (0.0151) 
= 0.00080~~  M(r,, + n)-I, 
where E~  is the elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal oppor- 
tunity cost of holding money balances, and r,>  + n = 0.0605. 
Since the  demand  deposit  component  of  M, is  now  generally  interest- 
bearing, non-interest-bearing money is now essentially currency plus bank re- 
serves. In  1994, currency plus reserves were 6.1  % of GDP. Thus, M  = 0.06  1 
GDP. There is a wide range of estimates of the elasticity of  money demand, 
corresponding to different definitions of money and different economic condi- 
tions. An estimate of cM  = 0.2 may be appropriate in the current context, with 
money defined as currency plus bank reserves.46  With these assumptions, G, = 
45. If  dr,)dT  remains constant. the optimal rate of inflation is  TT’  = -0.060.  Although this 
assumption of linearity may not be appropriate over the entire ranze, the basic property that r,, > 
7~’  > -p  is likely to remain valid in a more exact calculation, reflecting the interaction between 
taxes and inflation. 
46. In Feldstein (1979), I assumed an elasticity of one-third for non-interest-bearing M,  depos- 
its. I use the lower value now to reflect the fact that the non-interest-bearing money is  now just 
currency plus bank reserves. These are likely to be less interest sensitive than the demand-deposit 
component of  M,. The assumption that  E~,  = 0.2 when the opportunity cost of  holding money 
balances is approximately 0.06 implies that a 1 percentage point increase in r,, + TT  reduces M by 
approximately .2 (0.01)/0.06 = 0.033, a semielasticity of 3.3.  Since the Cagan estimates (1953) 
of this semielasticity ranged from F = 3 to F = 10, the selection of F,~,  = 02  in the current context 
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0.00016 GDP. Thus even when Friedman’s standard for the optimal money 
supply is used, the deadweight loss due to the distorted demand for money 
balances is only 0.0002 GDP 
3.5.2  The Revenue Effects of Reduced Money Demand 
The decline in inflation affects government revenue in three ways. First, the 
reduction in the inflation “tax” on money balances results in a loss of seignior- 
age and therefore an associated welfare loss of raising revenue by other distor- 
tionary taxes (Phelps 1973). In equilibrium, inflation at rate T implies revenue 
equal to nM.  Increasing the inflation rate raises the seigniorage revenue by 
d(Seigni0rage)ldn = M  + n(dM/dn) 
(26)  = M + n [dMld(rn  + n)][d(r,,  + n)Idn] 
= M  { 1 -  F,  [d(rn  + n)ldn]n(r,,  + n)-’]. 
With M = 0.061 GDP, E,  = 0.2, d(r,, + n)Idn = 0.755, n = 0.02, and rn + 
T = 0.0605, equation 26 implies that d(Seigniorage)lh  = 0.058 GDfl A de- 
crease of  inflation from n = 0.02 to T = 0 causes a loss of  seigniorage of 
0.11  6% of GDP. 
The corresponding welfare loss is O.l16A% of GDP. With A  = 0.4, the wel- 
fare cost of the lost seigniorage is 0.046% of GDP. With A = l .5, the welfare 
cost of the lost seigniorage is 0.174% of GDP. 
The second revenue effect is the revenue loss that results from shifting capi- 
tal to money balances from other productive assets.47  The decrease in business 
capital is equal to the increase in the money stock, M, -  M, = [dM/d(r,,  + 
n)](O.O151)  = 0.0151 .sMM(r,l  + n)-’  = 0.30% of  GDP. When these assets 
are invested in business capital, they  earn a real pretax return of  9.2% but a 
net-of-tax return of only 4.54%. The difference is the corporate and personal 
47. This is analogous to the revenue gain associated with the shift of assets from housing into 
business capital discussed in section 3.4. 148  Martin Feldstein 
tax payments of 4.66%. Applying this to the incremental capital of 0.30% of 
GDP implies a revenue loss of 0.0466(0.30) = 0.014% of GDP. The welfare 
gain from this extra revenue is 0.014A% of  GDP. With  A  = 0.4, the welfare 
loss from this source is 0.006% of GDP, while with A = 1.5  the loss is 0.021% 
of GDP. 
The final revenue effect of the change in the demand for money is the result 
of the government's ability to substitute the increased money balance of M, - 
M2  for interest-bearing government debt. Although this is a one-time substitu- 
tion, it reduces the government debt service permanently  by  r,,,(M, -  MJ, 
where rng  is the real interest rate paid  by  the government  on its outstanding 
debt net of the tax that it collects on those interest payments. A conservative 
estimate of  rn,,  based on the observed 1994 ratio of interest payments to na- 
tional debt of 0.061, an assumed tax rate of 0.25, and a 1994 inflation rate of 
2.7% is r,,, = 0.75(0.061) -  0.027 = 0.018. The reduced debt service cost in 
perpetuity is thus 0.018(M, -  M2) = 0.000054 GDP: The corresponding wel- 
fare gains are 0.002% of GDP at A  = 0.4 and 0.008% of GDP at A = l .5. 
Combining  these three effects yields a net welfare loss due to decreased 
revenue of 0.05% of GDP if  A  = 0.4 and of 0.19%  of GDP if A = 1.5. 
Although all of the effects that depend on the demand for money are small, 
the welfare loss from reduced seigniorage revenue is much larger than the wel- 
fare gain from the reduced distortion of money demand and the shift of assets to 
tax-paying business investments. When considering this small reduction in in- 
flation, the Phelps revenue effect dominates the Bailey money-demand effect. 
3.6  Debt Service and the Government Budget Constraint 
The final effect of reduced inflation that I will consider is the higher real 
cost of  servicing the national debt that results from a reduction in the rate of 
inflation. This higher debt service cost occurs because inflation leaves the real 
pretax interest rate on government debt unchanged while the inflation premium 
is subject to tax at the personal  level. A lower inflation  rate therefore does 
not change the pretax cost of debt service but reduces the tax revenue on the 
government debt payments. This in turn requires a higher level of other distor- 
tionary taxes?* 
To assess the effect of inflation on the net cost of debt service, note that the 
increase in the outstanding stock of government debt (B)  can be written as 
(27)  AB = (r, + T)  B  + G -  T -  €Ii (r, + T)  B, 
where (rg  + T)  is the nominal pretax interest rate of government debt and 0, is 
the effective rate of tax on such interest payments. Thus, (rg  + T)B  is the gross 
48.  Note that the effect of inflation on business tax revenue (through the tax-inflation interaction 
on depreciation and corporate debt) has been counted in the above discussion of taxes and saving. 
This ignores the role of retained earnings and the effect of changes in the mixture of corporate 
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interest payment  on the government debt, and (1 - 8Jrg + T)B  is the  net 
interest on that debt. G is all other government spending, and T is all tax reve- 
nue other than the revenue collected from taxing the interest on government 
debt. 
In equilibrium, the stock of government debt must grow at the same rate as 
nominal GDP, that is, AB = B(n + g  + T),  where n is the rate of growth 
of  population and g is the rate of growth per capita output. Combining this 
equilibrium condition with equation 27 implies 
(28)  TIGDP = GIGDP + [(I -  el)  rx -  -  g -  e,T]  BIGDP. 
Thus, d(T1GDP)ldT = -8,  (BIGDP). 
Reducing the inflation rate from 2% to zero increases the real cost of debt 
service (i.e., increases the level of taxes required to maintain the existing debt/ 
GDP ratio) by 0.02 0,  B. With 0, = 0.25 and the current debt-to-GDP ratio of 
BIGDP = 0.5, the 2-percentage-point reduction would reduce tax revenue by 
0.25% of  GDP and would therefore reduce welfare by 0.25X% of  GDP. The 
welfare cost of increased net debt service is therefore between 0.10% of GDP 
and 0.38% of GDP, depending on the value of  A. These figures are shown in 
row 6 of table 3.1. 
3.7  The Net Effect of Lower Inflation on Economic Welfare 
I can now bring together the several effects of reduced inflation that have 
been identified  and evaluated in sections 3.3 through 3.6 and compare them 
with the one-time output losses required to achieve that inflation reduction that 
were discussed in section 3.2. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the four effects, distinguishing the direct effects of 
reduced  distortion and the indirect effects that occur through the change in 
revenue. Separate values are given for the alternative savings demand elasticit- 
ies (qsr  = 0.4, qs, = 0, and qs,. = 1.0) and for the alternative estimates of the 
deadweight  loss per  dollar  of  revenue raised  through  alternative  distorting 
taxes (A = 0.4 and A = 1.5). 
These relatively large gains from reduced inflation reflect primarily the fact 
that the existing system of capital taxation  imposes large deadweight losses 
even in the absence of  inflation and that these deadweight losses are exacer- 
bated by inflation. 
Reducing these distortions by lowering the rate of inflation produces annual 
welfare gains of  1.14% of GDP in the benchmark saving case where there is a 
very  small positive  relation between  saving and the real net rate of interest 
(qs,  = 0.4). The deadweight loss distortions in the other two cases, shown at 
the bottom of column I, are 0.85% of GDP and 1.56% of GDP. 
The additional welfare effects of  changes in revenue,  summarized  at the 
bottom of columns 3 and 4) can be either negative or positive but on balance 
are smaller than the direct effects of reduced distortion. In the benchmark case 150  Martin Feldstein 
of  -qsr = 0.4, the total revenue effects reduce welfare, but the reductions are 
relatively small (between -0.13  at A  = 0.4 and -0.51  at A  = 1.5). 
The total welfare effect of reducing inflation from 2% to zero is therefore a 
gain in the benchmark saving case of between 0.63% of GDP a year and 1.01% 
of GDP a year. A higher saving response increases the net gain, while a lower 
saving response reduces it. 
If the cost of reducing the inflation rate from 2% to zero is a one-time cumu- 
lative loss of 6% of  GDP, as Ball’s analysis (1994) discussed in section 3.2 
implies,  the  estimated  gains in  the benchmark  case  would  offset  this  cost 
within six to eight years. If  savings are more responsive, the gain from price 
stability would offset the cost even more quickly. Only if saving is completely 
interest-inelastic and revenue raising has a high deadweight loss does the esti- 
mated total effect imply that the welfare gains would take more than a decade 
to exceed the lost GDP that is required to achieve price stability. Even in this 
case, the present value of the annual benefits of eliminating inflation exceeds 
10% of the initial GDP if the growing benefit stream is discounted by the his- 
toric real return on the Standard and Poor’s portfolio. 
3.8  The Limits of  Indexing 
Since the gains from reduced inflation that are evaluated in this paper reflect 
the interaction of taxes and inflation, it is natural to ask whether the same gains 
might not be achieved  without  a loss of  output by  indexing the tax  system. 
While this would in theory be possible, I present here some of the reasons why 
that is not a practical alternative to reducing inflation. 
It should be noted from the outset that there is a long history of proposals to 
index the tax system, motivated not only by the desire to reduce the deadweight 
losses of  the type discussed in this paper but also because a tax system that 
bases taxes on nominal capital income and expenses is regarded as inherently 
unfair. Individuals pay capital gains taxes even if  they have real losses. The 
effective tax rate on interest income may exceed  100% even if  the statutory 
rate is only 25%. Allowing only nominal depreciation on plant and equipment 
can be substantially reduce the return on business investment during times of 
relatively  high  inflation. All of  these issues received  heightened  public  and 
professional attention in the late 1970s and early  1980s when  US. inflation 
rates exceed 10%. 
Despite public and professional support for indexing and proposals by  the 
Reagan  administration to introduce such indexing, the taxation  of  capital in- 
come remains uninde~ed.~~  The United States is not alone in not indexing the 
taxation of capital income. In no major industrial country are taxes levied only 
49. Although tax brackets are adjusted for the rise in the price level, this does nothing to remedy 
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on real income and deductions allowed only for real expenses.5o  The reasons 
are partly technical, partly administrative, and partly, as in Germany, a matter 
of political conviction. 
Consider first the technical “legal” problems of designing rules about what 
should be indexed and what should not. In principle, the problem is easy. Inter- 
est income should be taxed only after subtracting the product of the inflation 
rate and the principle of  the fixed-income asset. Thus, a bond with a market 
price of $100 that pays interest of $7 in a year in which the price level rose by 
4% would create taxable income of only $3.” In contrast, the dividend income 
on a stock should be taxed in full because the value of the underlying equity 
is not fixed in nominal terms and should in principle rise with the general price 
level. When the stock is sold, a capital gain would be taxed only to the extent 
that the nominal value of the asset rises by more than the increase in the price 
level. 
But the world consists of more than such “plain vanilla” bonds and stocks. 
Consider a convertible bond. If the price of  the stock is high enough relative 
to the conversion price and the bond can currently be converted, the bond has 
all of  the “inflation  protection”  attributes of the stock (as well as the extra 
protection of a fixed-interest obligation). How should such a convertible bond 
be taxed? If  the “bond”  is trading in the market like a stock, it might seem 
reasonable to tax it like a stock and not allow any inflation adjustment even 
though the annual payments are called “interest” payments. Failure to do so 
might encourage companies to  issue short-term convertible bonds below the 
conversion price. But a general rule that convertible bonds should be taxed like 
equity  would  not be appropriate  for a bond that has a conversion  price far 
above the actual price of the stock and is therefore trading like a bond. 
To  take another  simple but realistic example, consider commercial  mort- 
gages in which the interest and principle are linked to the rents in the building 
or, in the case of stores, to the gross nominal receipts of the store. What if the 
mortgage pays the higher of  some fixed nominal amounts and the rent-linked 
amount? Should these mortgage payments be treated like debt or equity? How 
should they be treated for the borrower? 
Any rule that tries to draw a line between debt and equity for the purpose of 
inflation adjustment will create powerful incentives to create tax-advantaged 
50. Some countries have indexed some part of their tax laws. In the United Kingdom, capital 
gains are taxed on an inflation-adjusted basis and only above a substantial annual exclusion. Mex- 
ico has probably gone further than any other country in the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development in adopting the indexation principles first outlined by  the Carter Cornrnis- 
sion in Canada in the  1960s, but even Mexico has not provided full indexation. The Canadians 
never adopted the indexation proposals of the Carter Commission. 
51. Even in this simple case there is a problem if the nominal price of the bond fluctuates during 
the year. Does one use the beginning or the end or the average value? If  some “reasonable” but 
arbitrary compromise like using the beginning-of-year value is used, will sophisticated investors 
trade such bonds to get unfair (and distorting) real net-of-tax interest rates? 152  Martin Feldstein 
securities. The ability to create derivative securities  tailored  to the  tax  law 
makes this problem even worse because it would allow investors to have and 
to trade the tax-advantaged  features of  securities without having  other attri- 
butes that they do not want. In the case of the index-linked mortgage, it would 
be possible to strip out the excess, if any, of the index-linked portion over the 
fixed-income portion. How should that derivative security be taxed? 
In addition to the technical legal problems, there are purely administrative 
problems. Consider for example the problem of inflation-adjusting interest re- 
ceipts on securities held for only part of  a year. In principle, the solution is 
easy. But consider the administrative problem for an individual who transfers 
money frequently into and out of a saving account or checking account. 
Again, any simplification or rough approximation would provide an incen- 
tive for sophisticated investors to move large sums of money to take advantage 
of the opportunity to borrow and lend under different tax rules. These problems 
of microtiming may not matter much when the inflation rate is low, but any tax 
rule should be applicable in higher-inflation-rate environments. 
Consider next the special problem of indexing capital gains. This has been 
a frequent proposal in the Congress over the past two decades and has received 
bipartisan support because of the widely perceived unfairness of taxing nomi- 
nal “profits” when the real gains on those transactions are negative. The basic 
idea would be to increase the “cost” for the purpose of calculating taxable gain 
by the ratio of the price level at the time of  sale to the price level at the time 
that the asset was purchased. If this adjustment is permitted to create taxable 
losses when the rise in the nominal value of the security is less than the rise in 
the price level, it is likely that the capital gains tax would cease to collect any 
revenue at all. Since individuals can decide when to realize gains and losses, it 
is very likely that individuals holding a widely diversified portfolio could al- 
ways find enough stocks with real losses to offset the real taxable gains on 
those stocks that they choose to se1LS2  To avoid this result, indexation proposals 
in the Congress would not allow individuals to take a loss when the nominal 
value of the asset has not fallen. If such legislation were to pass, it would create 
the incentive to produce new conglomerate securities that preserved as much 
as possible of this tax advantage. The indexing rule would substitute one distor- 
tion for 
Consider finally the tax treatment of owner-occupied  housing. It would in 
principle be possible to limit the mortgage deduction only to the real compo- 
52. Recall that under current law assets held until death are not subject to a capital gains tax in 
the hands of either the decedent or the heir; the “cost” of the asset is “stepped up” to the market 
value at the time of the owner’s death and subsequent gains are calculated only relative to the value 
at that time. 
53. It is, of course, easy to suggest that these problems could be remedied by more fundamental 
reforms of the taxation of capital gains. It would take this paper too far afield to discuss some of 
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nent of the mortgage payment.54  That would of course create incentives  for 
individuals who can do so to borrow in other more tax-favored ways. But even 
apart from that, it is clear from the analysis of  section 3.4 that limiting the 
mortgage deduction alone does very little to reduce the distortion and the reve- 
nue loss associated with the current tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. 
As the  analysis there  showed, reducing  the  inflation  rate from 2% to zero 
would produce a substantial welfare gain even for those who do not currently 
itemize their mortgage deductions at all. 
In addition to these technical and administrative problems, there is a more 
fundamental concern that an indexed tax system might lead to less public sup- 
port for anti-inflationary policies. If the tax indexing serves only to reduce but 
not to eliminate the adverse effects of inflation but leads to policies that pro- 
duce a higher rate of inflation, the net effect of indexing on economic welfare 
may be negative.55 
3.9  Conclusion 
The calculations in this paper imply that the interaction of existing tax rules 
and inflation cause a significant  welfare loss even at a low rate of inflation. 
More specifically, the analysis implies that shifting the equilibrium rate of in- 
flation from 2% to zero would cause a perpetual welfare gain equal to about 
1% of  GDP a year. The deadweight loss of 2% inflation is so large because 
inflation exacerbates the distortions that would be caused by existing capital 
income taxes, even with price stability. 
To assess the desirability of achieving price stability, the gain from eliminat- 
ing this loss has to be compared to the one-time cost of disinflation. Shifting 
from 2% inflation to price stability is estimated to have a cost equal to about 
5% of GDP. Since the  1% of  GDP annual welfare gain from price  stability 
continues forever and grows at the same rate as GDP (i.e., at about 2.5% a 
year), the present value of the welfare gain is very large. Discounting the an- 
nual gains at the rate that investors require for risky equity investments (i.e., at 
the 5.1% real net-of-tax rate of return on Standard and Poor’s portfolio from 
1969 to  1994) implies a present value  gain equal to more than  35% of the 
initial level of GDP. The benefit of achieving price stability therefore substan- 
tially exceeds its cost. 
This welfare  gain could  in  principle  also be  achieved by  eliminating  all 
capital-income  taxes  or  by  indexing  capital-income  taxes  so that  taxes  are 
54. I should emphasize “in principle” because any attempt to limit mortgage deductions meets 
with overwhelming political objections. In a nation of 60 million homeowners, even those who do 
not currently have mortgages worry rightly that limiting the mortgage deduction would reduce the 
value of their largest asset. 
55. This is the argument developed in Fischer and Summers (1989).  It is the logic that underlies 
the German constitutional prohibition against any kind of indexing. 154  Martin Feldstein 
based only on real income  and real  expenses. The paper has discussed the 
technical and administrative difficulties that are likely to keep such indexing 
from being adopted. Although some of  the current proposals for tax reform 
would eliminate capital-income  taxation, their prospects  are very uncertain. 
The magnitude of the annual gain from reducing inflation is so large that the 
expected present value of the gain from disinflating from 2%  inflation to price 
stability would be positive even if there were a 50% change that capital-income 
taxes would be completely eliminated after ten years. 
The analysis in this paper does not discuss the distributional consequences 
of the disinflation or of the reduced inflation. Some readers may believe that 
the output loss caused by the disinflation should be weighted more heavily than 
the gain from low inflation because the output loss falls disproportionately on 
lower-income individuals and does so in the form of the large individual losses 
associated with unemployment. It would, however, take very large weights to 
overcome the difference between the 5% of GDP output loss of  disinflation 
and the 35+% of GDP present-value gain from lower inflation. 
The analysis in  this  paper could be extended in  several ways. The paper 
presents estimates of the annual steady-state gain from lower inflation. To get 
a more accurate calculation of the present value, it would be desirable to study 
the time path of those gains. A more complete measure of the effects of infla- 
tion on saving and on the timing of consumption would extend the analysis to 
precautionary saving and to institutional saving in pensions and insurance. It 
would also be desirable to look at the deadweight losses and revenue effects 
of the impact of inflation on business investment. 
Although the current research has shown that shifting from low inflation to 
price stability is likely to raise economic welfare, the paper has not derived the 
optimal rate of inflation. The large literature on that subject, starting with the 
contributions of Friedman (1969) and Phelps (1973), has focused on the distor- 
tion to money demand and the resulting seigniorage gain. As the present paper 
shows, those effects are much smaller than the effects caused by the interaction 
of inflation and capital taxation. A future paper will report the implications of 
the current analysis for the optimal rate of inflation. 
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Comment  Andrew B. Abel 
Martin Feldstein has presented a fresh and interesting analysis of the costs and 
benefits of moving from a low rate of inflation to a zero rate of inflation. This 
analysis emphasizes fiscal channels-both  direct and indirect. The direct fiscal 
channels are familiar to readers of the literature on inflation and taxation that 
Feldstein pioneered almost two decades ago, though the calculations and the 
context presented here are new. These effects arise because the tax code in the 
United States is not neutral with respect to inflation-in  particular the taxation 
of  capital income is sensitive to the rate of inflation. The indirect fiscal chan- 
nels arise through the government’s budget constraint, which requires that any 
changes in seigniorage associated with  a reduction in inflation be offset by 
changes in other taxes and/or government expenditures. 
In order to judge the desirability of  moving to price stability, one needs to 
compare the costs and benefits of eliminating inflation. The potential cost of 
eliminating inflation  is the  temporary increase in unemployment  that might 
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accompany a reduction in the rate of inflation. Feldstein uses the results of a 
survey by Ball (1994) to conclude that reducing the rate of inflation from 2% 
per year to zero would impose a one-time cost of 4-6%  of GDP. The calcula- 
tion of the benefits of reducing inflation occupies the bulk of the paper. Reduc- 
ing the rate of  inflation reduces various distortions, and Feldstein calculates 
that the benefit of having zero inflation rather than 2%  inflation is about 1% of 
GDP per year. Because the benefits of reduced distortions accrue forever (and 
they are proportional to GDP, which is growing), Feldstein concludes that the 
present value of the permanent flow of benefits (using any reasonable discount 
rate) exceeds the one-time unemployment cost of eliminating inflation. 
Like Feldstein’s paper, this comment focuses on the calculation of the bene- 
fits of eliminating inflation, though I follow a different analytic strategy. I will 
use a variant of the Sidrauski (1967) model to compute the welfare effects of 
eliminating inflation. The major features of Feldstein’s analysis can be incorpo- 
rated by the following three modifications  of  the Sidrauski model. First, the 
model includes two types of capital that are to be interpreted as housing capital 
and nonhousing capital. Second, the model includes a government budget con- 
straint that integrates monetary and fiscal policy. This budget constraint cap- 
tures the effects of various distortionary taxes and takes account of  the fact 
emphasized by Feldstein that distortionary tax rates will need to be changed to 
offset any change in seigniorage when inflation is eliminated. Third, labor sup- 
ply is endogenized so that taxes on labor income are distortionary. In the stan- 
dard version  of  the Sidrauski model with  exogenous labor supply, taxes on 
labor income do not distort labor supply and would fail to capture some of the 
effects arising through distortionary taxation that are important in Feldstein’s 
calculations. 
An Extension of the Sidrauski Model 
Consider a closed economy with N, identical consumers in period t. The 
population grows at rate n so that  1 + n = NIIN,-l.  There are two types of 
capital: nonhousing capital (type 1) and housing capital (type 2). Let K!  ,  be the 
aggregate capital stock of type i (i = 1,2) at the beginning of period t, L, be 
the aggregate labor input in period t,  p,  be the price of goods in terms of money, 
MI  be the aggregate nominal money supply at the beginning of period t, and B, 
be the aggregate nominal stock of government bonds at the beginning of period 
t. It is convenient to focus on the real per capita values of these variables: kt,, 
=  K,,,IN,,  e, =  L,IN,, m, =  M,I(P,N,),  and b, =  B,/(p,N,). 
The Consumer’s Problem 
Asset accumulation of an individual consumer is described by 158  Martin Feldstein 
The right-hand side of equation  1  represents the consumer's real disposable 
resources in period t which consists of (1) after-tax wage income, where w,  is 
the real wage rate and T~,  is the tax rate on wages; (2)  the value of capital held 
at the beginning of period t plus any earnings on the capital, where R,,,  repre- 
sents the after-tax gross return (i.e., principal plus income, after tax) on capital 
of type i; (3)  the value of government bonds held at the beginning of period t 
plus after-tax interest earnings on the bonds, where if is the after-tax interest 
rate on bonds; and (4) the real value of money balances held at the beginning of 
period t. The left-hand side of equation 1 represents the consumer's spending in 
period t,  which consists of (1) consumption c,;  (2)  capital to carry into period 
t + 1; (3)  real money balances to carry into period t + 1, where T,+~  =  p,+,/p, 
is the gross rate of inflation; and (4) bonds to carry into period t + 1. 
The utility function of the consumer is 
where p, 6, q,  4,  and + are positive constants. The consumer chooses consump- 
tion, each type of  capital, real money  balances, bonds, and  labor supply to 
maximize utility in equation 2 subject to the budget constraint in equation  1. 
Letting  PIX, be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint in equation  1, the 
first-order conditions are 




(kt,,): PAIR,,,  = A,-,  (1 + n),  i = 12; 
(m,):  P+mLS + PA, = A,-,(I  + n)~,; 
(b,):  PA,( 1 + if) = A,+l  (1 + n)~,; 
(3e)  (e,):  -+e:  + A, (I -  T,)w,  = 0. 
I will focus on the steady state in which all of the time-subscripted variables 
in  equation  (3) are  constant.  Solving  these  equations  yields  the  following 
steady-state relations: 
l+n 
Ri =  ~  ,  i = 1,2; 
P 
In the steady state, the after-tax real gross return on all nonmonetary assets 
is (1 + n)/P.  According to equation 4a, the after-tax real return on both types 159  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
of capital is (1 + n)/P.' The after-tax real return on bonds is (1 + ib)/r,  which, 
according to equation 4b, is also equal to (1 + n)/P. Money offers a lower 
pecuniary rate of return than bonds (if  ib > 0), but consumers willingly hold 
money because money offers a nonpecuniary return +wS.  The optimal hold- 
ing of money is reflected  in equation 4c. Finally, equation 4d shows that the 
consumer supplies labor to the point that the disutility of working an additional 
unit is just offset by the additional utility made possible by earning additional 
after-tax wage income. 
The Production Function 
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function of labor and each type 
of capital. Under the assumption of  constant returns to scale, the production 
function can be written (omitting time subscripts) in intensive form as 
(5)  y  = AkyIk;2e1-a~-az, 
where y = Y/N  is output per capita, and the factor shares al,  a2,  and 1 -  a,  - 
a2  are all positive. In a competitive economy, factors are paid the value of their 
marginal product. Thus the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor, 
(6) 
The marginal product of  type  i capital is a,y/k,. Thus, assuming that capital 
does not depreciate, the after-tax gross rate of return on type i capital is 
w = (1 -  a,  -  'Y*)y/l. 
(7)  R, = (1 - 
where 7, is the tax rate on the (net) return to capital of type i. 
Government Budget Constraint 
straint. In the steady state the government budget constraint is 
(8)  Tn  (1 -  a1 -  a2)Y  'T1aIY 
Monetary and fiscal policy  are integrated by  the government budget con- 
+ T~'Y~~  + [(l + n)r -  l]m = g + [I + ih -  (1 + n)~r]b. 
The four terms on the left-hand side of equation 8 are the sources of govern- 
ment revenue: wage tax revenue, tax on income accruing to k,,  tax on income 
accruing to k2,  and seigniorage revenue. The right-hand side of equation 8 con- 
tains two types of government spending: real purchases of goods and services 
in the amount of g per capita; and interest payments on government debt, net 
of taxes on interest and rollover of debt. Now divide both sides of equation 8 
by y, and use equation 4b to obtain 
1. The rate of  return on each type of  capital is determined endogenously by  equation 7 below. 
In the absence of any taxes, the condition that the gross rate of return on capital equals (1 + n)lP 
is simply the Modified Golden Rule. 160  Martin Feldstein 
m  + [(l + n)7r - 11  ~ 
Y 
7x,  (1 - a, -  a,) + ?,a,  +  (9) 
The government chooses the values of inflation 7r, the tax rates on capital 7, 
and 72,  the ratio of government purchases to output g/y, and the ratio of govern- 
ment bonds to output bty. The tax rate on wages 7M  is determined endogenously 
by equation 9. 
Steady-State Equilibrium 
ket clearing condition 
The steady state is characterized by equations 4-7  and 9 and the goods mar- 
It can be shown that the steady-state values of k,, kZ,  c, m, and t'  are given by 
m = [,  1 (  l+n  -7r - 1)c-.]7: 
Calibration of the Model 
The population growth rate n is set equal to 0.01. The values of other param- 
eters and variables used in the initial calibration of the model are presented in 
table 3C.  1. Of the six preference  parameters,  four are set exogenously. The 
time-preference discount factor p is 0.95, which implies a rate of time prefer- 
ence of about  5%  per year. Calibration  studies typically choose values  of  p 
greater than one but generally not much larger than five, though there are ex- 
amples of much larger values of p in the asset pricing literature. Here I choose 161  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
Table 3C.1  Initial Calibration of the Model 
Variable  Value  Source 
Preference parameters 
P  0.95 
P  4 
11  10 
6  5  +  0.001  65  1 
ICI  7.71 X  lo-” 
A  388.1744 
0.233 
a2  0.067 
dY  0.2 
blY  0.5 
rr  1.02 
71  0.5598 
72  -0.2061 
7,  0.1550 
Empirical aggregates to be matched 
V  6,011 
m  390 
Production parameters 





chosen to match m below 
chosen to make 8 = 1 






exogenous (from Feldstein) 
exogenous (from Feldstein) 
residual: government budget constraint 
net national product 
monetary base 
p = 4. The value of q is even less well established. Here I set q = 10. The 
interest elasticity of  money demand equals -  1/6. Estimates of  this elasticity 
are very small, so I choose 6 = 5,  which implies an interest elasticity of money 
demand equal to -0.2,  as in Feldstein’s calculations. The value of + is chosen 
so that the model produces a value of  m = 390, which is the 1994 value of 
monetary base in the United States measured in billions of dollars. The value 
of  @ is chosen so that the model produces a value of e = 1 in its initial cali- 
bration. 
The values of a,  and a2  that appear in the production function are chosen so 
that k2/k, = 0.79, which is the ratio of residential capital to the sum of equip- 
ment and structures.2 Using the fact that k,/k, = ((1 -  ~~)a,)/((l  -  TJ~,), 
constraining aI  + a2  to equal 0.3, and using the values of  T,  and T~ based on 
Feldstein’s calculations (see table 3C.2), yields a,  = 0.233 and a2  = 0.067. 
The total factor productivity parameter A is chosen so that y matches the value 
of actual output. The assumption that capital does not depreciate can be inter- 
preted to mean that all depreciation is a reduction in output, and thus the pro- 
duction function can be viewed as a function that yields net national product 
(NNP) rather than gross national product. Thus, the value of y that is matched 
is 6,Ol I, which is the 1994 value of NNP measured in billions of dollars. 
2. This ratio is calculated using  1991 data from “Summary of Fixed Reproducible Tangible 
Wealth Series 1925-91,”  table 1, in U.S. Department of Commerce 1992, 29. 162  Martin Feldstein 
Table 3C.2  Tax Rates 
Rate of  Return Nonhousing Capital 
R, -  1  0.0920  A1  -0.0533 
(1 -  T;='02) (R, -  1)  0.0405  I  0.5598 
(1 -  'T;=')  (R, -  I)  0.0454  I  0.5065 
Tn- I  02 
Tn=  I 
Rental Cost of  Housing 
Itemizers 
r 
(1 + -r;='O*)r 
(1 + T;=')r 
Nonitemizers 
r 
(1 + T;=lUz)r 
(I + T;=')r 
r 
(I + T;='"')r 
(1 + T;=I)r 
Average of itemizers and nonitemizers 





















Of  the  six variables representing  government policy,  three  are chosen to 
match the data directly: the ratio of government purchases to output, gly, is set 
equal to 0.2; the ratio of government debt to output, bly, is set equal to 0.5; and 
the gross rate of  inflation, T,  is set equal to 1.02 per year. The tax rates on the 
two types of capital are based on the calculations in Feldstein, as displayed in 
table 3C.2. Consider, for example, nonhousing capital.  As shown in table 3C.2, 
the pretax rate of return, R, -  1, on this capital is 9.2% per year, and the after- 
tax rate of return is 4.05% per year when the rate of inflation is 2% per year. 
(These rates of return are computed by Feldstein.) Thus, the tax rate on non- 
housing capital when inflation is 2% is T;=' O2  = 0.5598. Feldstein calculates 
that at zero inflation the after-tax rate of return on nonhousing capital is 4.54%, 
so that the tax rate on type 1 capital is T;=' = 0.5065. Thus, the change in the 
tax rate that results directly from a reduction in inflation is A, = -0.0533.  For 
housing capital 1 use the average of the values reported by Feldstein for item- 
izers  and nonitemizers.  The tax  rate on wage income, T,, is a residual  that 
makes the government's  steady-state budget constraint in equation 9 hold. 
Effect of Eliminating Inflation 
As emphasized by Feldstein, the effective tax rates on both types of capital 
depend on the rate of inflation. Therefore, the elimination of inflation changes 
these effective tax rates. Let A, be the direct effect on the tax rate 7,  of reducing 
the rate of inflation to zero (i.e., setting T = 1). In addition, there are indirect 
effects on the tax rates that are needed to satisfy the government's budget con- 163  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
straint. The new set of tax rates, incorporating both the direct effect of inflation 
(including the possibility of a direct effect, A,,  of inflation on the labor income 
tax rate) and the indirect effect of the government’s budget constraint, are 
and 
(1  2c)  T~  = (7:  + A,)0, 
where the superscript 0 denotes the initial values of the tax rates, and 0 is the 
amount by which all three tax rates must be multiplied in order to satisfy the 
government’s steady-state budget constraint. The direct effects, A,, are exoge- 
nous but the indirect effect, captured by 0, is endogenous.3 
To illustrate the welfare effects of eliminating inflation, I compare the initial 
equilibrium  in  which  the  steady-state  value  of  the  triplet  (c,m,e) equals 
(co,mo,  1) and the new steady-state equilibrium in which the triplet equals (few, 
mnew,  Pew’).  To express the change in welfare in terms of a change in consump- 
tion, define c’  to be the level of consumption, combined with the initial values 
of  real money balances and labor, that yields the same level of utility in the 
steady state as the zero-inflation steady-state equilibrium. That is, 
(13)  u(c*,  m0, 1) = u(cnew,  mnew,  en=-). 
Using the utility function specified in equation 2,  the definition of c* in equa- 
I use (c’ -  co)/co  as a measure of the benefit of eliminating inflation,  and I 
compare it to Feldstein’s measure of the benefit of eliminating inflation, which 
is expressed as a fraction of GDP. 
Table 3C.3 presents the effects of reducing the inflation rate from 2% per 
year (IT  = 1.02) to zero (IT  = 1). Column 1 ignores the direct effect of inflation 
on the effective tax rates on the two types of capital, and takes account only of 
the indirect effects on tax rates arising as a result of the change in seigniorage 
revenue when inflation is reduced. This channel corresponds most closely to 
Feldstein’s “money demand” channel, and the calculated benefit, (c* -  co)/co, 
is in the middle of the range of benefits found by Feldstein and reported in the 
last row of numbers in table 3C.3. Column 2 focuses on the direct effect of 
inflation  on the effective tax rate on nonhousing capital, which corresponds 
most closely to Feldstein’s “consumption timing” channel. Column 3 focuses 
3. In all policies examined here, the values of gly and bly are held constant. 164  Martin Feldstein 
Table 3C.3  Effects of Policy Changes 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






0  0 
-0.0533  0  - 
0  0.0337 





Government Policy Variables: Endogenous 
1.0033  1.0584 
0.1555  0.1641 
0.5616  0.5361 

















(c* -  C n  )/CO 




































(-0.05,  I .64) 
”This range corresponds to parameter values that Feldstein considers most likely. The wider range 
helow is based on a broader set of parameter values used by Feldstein. 
on the direct effect of  inflation on the effective tax rate on housing capital, 
which corresponds most closely to Feldstein’s “housing demand” channel. The 
final column of table 3C.3 considers all three effects t~gether.~ 
Considering the differences in analytic strategies, the results that I obtained 
using the Sidrauski model are strikingly close to those reported by Feldstein. 
Both sets of results have the following four features: First, the benefits arising 
through the money-demand channel are slightly negative but tiny. Second, the 
benefits arising through the housing-demand channel are positive but relatively 
small. Third, the largest benefits arise as a result of reducing the distortions in 
the effective tax rate on nonhousing capital. Fourth, taking account of all three 
4. Feldstein also calculates effects operating through a “debt service” channel, hut in  the Si- 
drauski model presented here, the steady-state after-tax real interest rate on debt is invariant to the 
inflation rate, so the debt-service channel is inoperative. 165  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability 
Table 3C.4  Robustness of Results 
(c' -  cO)/cO 
Tr=l  P = 1.02  7T  = 1.02  7T=l 
A, =O  A, = -0.0533  A, = 0  A, = -0.0533 
A2 = 0  A? = 0  A? = 0.0337  A2 = 0.0337 
Baseline  -0.0s  1.64  0.15  1.69 
p = 0.99  -0.14  1.19  0.24  1.30 
= 0.9  0.01  1.91  0.10  2.00 
p=  10  -0.08  1.59  0.14  1.65 
p=2  -0.09  I .68  0.15  1.73 
7 = 100  -0.09  I .72  0.15  1.78 
7=l  -0.08  1.46  0.14  1.52 
6 = 20  -0.12  1.63  0.15  1.65 
6=2  -0.02  I .65  0.15  1.78 
a,  + a? = 0.4a  -0.15  1.50  0.41  1.77 
a,  + (Y2 = 0.2  -0.04  1.33  0.02  1.30 
n=O  -0.10  1.75  0.13  1.77 
n = 0.02  -0.08  I .55  0.17  I .63 
da,/cr2  is same as in baseline. 
effects, the  annual benefit  of  eliminating  inflation is about  1% of  GDP per 
year (Feldstein) or about 1.7% of consumption per year (table 3C.3), which is 
slightly higher. 
Table 3C.4 explores the sensitivity of the results to changes in various pa- 
rameters. The baseline row of numbers repeats the values of (c* -  d')/~"  from 
the four columns of table 3C.3. In each of the other rows, one parameter at a 
time is changed from its baseline value, and the four values of (c' -  c0)/co are 
reported. In view of the large changes in parameter values examined, the re- 
sults of the model are very robust. Of course, a more complete sensitivity anal- 
ysis would change the values of more than one parameter at a time, but such 
an analysis is beyond the scope of this comment. 
The results of tables 3C.3 and 3C.4 lend strong support to Feldstein's conclu- 
sion that the annual benefit of reducing the inflation rate from 2%  to zero is on 
the order of  1 % of GDP. This support is especially strong in light of the fact 
that Feldstein and I used different analytic strategies to compute the benefits 
of reducing inflation. 
As discussed by Feldstein, for plausible discount rates, the calculated benefit 
of eliminating inflation has a present value that exceeds 6% of GDP, which is 
taken  as a measure of the cost of  eliminating inflation. This comparison of 
benefits and costs leads to the conclusion that welfare would be increased by 
reducing  inflation  to zero, though one might place more confidence in this 
conclusion if the benefits and costs of  reducing inflation were computed to- 
gether within a single model. 166  Martin Feldstein 
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